INTRODUCTION

The deterioration of employment conditions for an increasing number of employees in late capitalism has prompted researchers to find ways to conceptualise as well as measure the observed new tendencies. Although the term 'precarity' has been favoured by many, we envisage that what we observe nowadays resembles a process of precarisation whereby employees are observing a worsening of aspects of their employment. This tendency has been explained by various strands of the literature, but as mentioned in the first chapter of the book the structural elements of the precarisation processes seem to dominate. In addition to that, the book includes a discussion of the policy developments in a series of EU countries with the aim to show how precarisation has been directly linked with certain labour market reforms implemented both before and after the crisis. The conclusion we draw is that the crisis and the labour market reforms have constituted significant pillars of the strategy used by states and employers to respond to the crisis as well as promote their competitiveness agenda. The reduction of labour costs and the promotion of higher flexibility levels are the ultimate goals of that strategy, but the side effects include the inability to provide good quality jobs to a growing number of people, especially young people. The second part of the book has captured the extent of precarious employment utilising

various measurements and providing comparable evidence across the EU. A notable intensification of precarious employment over the last decade has been recorded with certain, vulnerable, groups being more affected than others.

1

THEORY, CONCEPTS AND EU CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

Precarity has occupied the theoretical and empirical studies of various social science fields (sociology, geography, industrial relations, labour economics) in recent years, mainly because it offers a plasticity and breadth that is supposedly lacking from other concepts used to grasp the increasing uncertainty experienced by many people in late capitalism. The initial use of the term by prominent sociological analyses (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991) denoted an attempt to conceptualise the deterioration of working conditions and the widespread feelings of insecurity endured by a growing number of people due to the dissolution of post-war relatively stable employment patterns. Initially, the term was used to theorise the insecurities felt by those at the bottom of the labour market and wage distribution including part-time, low-skilled and temporary staff. This conceptualisation has been expanded in recent years, however, mainly due to the realisation by many scholars that insecurity is not a state of affair affecting only workers on the lower end of labour markets or employed on

certain contracts (Kalleberg & Vallas, 2017). For this reason, many studies of precarious employment deal with diverse employment situations, ranging from non-standard employment contracts to standard low pay jobs with limited prospects and high uncertainty in terms of job security, working time and income. In that sense, one person does not have to fall into all the different variables of precarity to be categorised as precarious (Campbell & Burgess, 2018).

Significant amount of work has been dedicated in discovering the causes of precarity and explaining the main reasons that employment relations have been significantly deteriorated over the last 30–40 years. In most of this literature it is recognised that important pillars of the employment and social systems such as unions' power, collective agreements, employment protection legislation (EPL) and social security provision have been eroded since the 1980s in most countries, albeit in different ways and degrees (Dølvik & Martin, 2015, p. 333). These changes have been manifested in the declining importance and coverage of collective agreements as well as in the evident rise of employers' power to unilaterally define crucial aspects of the employment relationship (Busch, Hermann, Hinrichs, & Schulten, 2013). In many countries, the substantive content of collective agreements has been undermined by the introduction of clauses that allow firms to adjust pay and other issues to their needs, circumscribing in that way the meaning and purpose of this important institution. In many instances, employers avoid the implementation of collective agreements by using available exit options, including soft ones like the lax enforcement of labour law in some countries or more hard options like outsourcing their operations to other companies (Bosch, Mayhew, & Gautié, 2010). This might explain the fact that many employees find themselves in low-paid jobs despite the existence of collective agreements and rules in the industry or sector they work for.

In some countries, notably Germany, the phenomenon of institutional avoidance has intensified over the recent years, creating a rather exclusive employment relations framework with a growing number of low-paid and insecure workers (Lehndorff, 2016). Significant changes have also been noted over the last two decades in relation to the EPL with all countries implementing significant liberalisation reforms for both permanent and temporary contracts (Avdagic & Baccaro, 2014). Although significant variation exists in the extent that countries reformed their systems, employment protection declined in all OECD countries with detrimental effects on employees' sense of insecurity and pay levels (OECD, 2013).

Another indication of the worsening of employee's position is the decline in trade union membership and strike activity in almost all countries since the 1990s (Godard, 2011). This development needs further exploration but for the time being it is sufficient to say that the decline of collective resistance and the rebalancing of the employment relationship through successive reforms in favour of employers are important explanatory lenses for interpreting observed social and employment trends related with precarity. For instance, the increasing levels of inequality together with declining wage share in GDP and the diffusion of flexible contracts to a growing number of employees constitute foundational elements of the new employment landscape and demonstrate the effects of the changes noted above. Any institutional arrangement relies heavily and reflects the temporary power balance between actors so it should not come as a surprise that shifts in that balance bring about either radical or moderate changes in institutions (Gautié & Schmitt, 2010, p. 31).

The prevailing view in many accounts is that the above changes are linked with the declining significance of Fordist systems of work organisation and capitalist accumulation manifested in rigid and hierarchically organised structures and

corporatist policy-making. The stability of the employment relationship and the institutional arrangements put in place during that period were necessary constellations for providing legitimacy to capitalist development as well as sufficient levels of demand. The Keynesian style policies combined with wage–productivity deals between employers and trade unions secured some protection to workers while for employers it meant social and industrial peace as well as reassurance that socialist and anticapitalist narratives remain marginalised (Heery, 2016). The economic crisis of the late 1990s together with other changes in the world economy such as the rise of new global economic powers and the new division of labour resulted in the decline of Fordist systems of production and demand-side Keynesian policies. The rise of a new management of the economy paradigm underpinned by the neoclassical economics and neoliberal politics was the outcome of the belief that the new realities require novel solutions in employment, social and economic fields. A range of variables including flexibility in labour processes, products and consumption patterns altered the Fordist paradigms and disturbed stable employment and social patterns (Brown & Crompton, 1994, p. 20). The increasing use of part-time jobs accompanied with the use of time adjusters or staff adjusters – resourced predominantly by the young and female workforces – signifies the impact of cost-cutting priorities and adjustability concerns on structuring the profile and working conditions of the workforce. Another determinant of the intensified pressures for increasing work output and/or performance is the restructuring of a series of service jobs (for instance, extension of working hours in retail and shifts in hospitals). In cases where self-employment or project-based work prevails, work intensification originates from the discrepancy between the available hours and resources provided to workers with the targets and deadlines – determined

by market competition and company's profit target – required to be met within very restrictive time limits (Lehndorff & Voss-Dahm, 2005).

Evidence, however, suggests that the standard employment relationship of the Fordist period has been undermined even in professional spheres not associated with low-skilled service sector jobs like retail or hospitality. Processes of heightened casualisation and work degradation in professional fields like academia support the argument that aspects of precarity are also affecting those previously protected from the vagaries of the market (Morgan & Wood, 2017). The marketisation of public services with the implementation of market principles in state-run enterprises together with a series of organisational restructuring (outsourcing) in the private sector as a response to global competition have put a serious strain on working people's rights and remuneration. Since the eruption of the economic crisis many countries have introduced significant public-sector reforms (pay cuts, pension reforms and promotion of non-standard work) that considerably intensify the sense of precarity felt by employees. Although many reforms have been accompanied with and framed through empowerment management strategies tipped to increased autonomy, employees experience increased pressures to meet targets and adopt increased workloads as a survival strategy (Lehndorff & Voss-Dahm, 2005, p. 301). For this reason, some authors have argued that many employees on permanent contracts feel increased 'job status insecurity' as important aspects of their jobs are under threat while lack of control, anxiety and work intensity dominate their everyday work experience (Findlay & Thompson, 2017, p. 126).

In addition, the need for external flexibility of many firms is often satisfied by recourse to outsourcing (especially in specific sectors like home care services) whereby external organisations provide service delivery usually employing

migrant and low-skilled workers on low pay. This process has a manifold effect; on the one hand it converts the need of external flexibility of a given organisation into internal flexibility for another one (provider of outsourcing) while on the other hand it leads to a process of internalisation since more pressure is placed on core workers to accept worse terms and conditions since their job can be done with a much lower rate of pay (Lehndorff & Voss-Dahm, 2005). It can therefore be argued that the precarious conditions experienced by large numbers of the workforce in service sector occupations is the result of flexibility requirements prescribed by the nature of work and the cost-cutting objectives that many companies set up due to price competition and relaxing employment regulations.

Because of these changes, the composition of the workforce has been altered with a significant rise in casualised and non-standard jobs that fail to secure earnings higher than the poverty line. As early as 1988 in a study on the development of wages in the US, researchers (Bluestone & Harrison, 1988, p. 190) found that the US society has been polarised between those earning high wages and those at the bottom of the labour market (low-wage blue-collar and contingent jobs) while those in the middle have been constantly losing a significant part of their income due to wage stagnation. The same authors observe that for the lowest occupational categories there has been a sharp deterioration in terms of earnings and benefits as their workplace power was weakened due to the decline of union power and the coverage of collective bargaining. Thus, the evidence does suggest that business needs to reduce costs and adjust production (and workers) to changing demands were the factors accounting for the prevalence of non-standard work (Edgell, 2011). For this reason, the rise in certain forms of flexible employment such as part-time is indicative of deeper and structural changes that necessitate the

adoption of labour management strategies that can no longer guarantee secure and long-term jobs since their purpose is to benefit one side, the employers, of the employment relationship at the expense of the other, the employees (Edgell, 2011).

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRECARITY

The agreement in the literature over the increasing use of flexible forms of employment has not led to a consensus over its exact definition since different theoretical accounts use diverse explanatory lenses to identify the origin of precarity. Similarly, these theoretical approaches propose distinctive policies and ideas for tackling precarity and reducing the insecurity experienced nowadays by an increasing number of employees. In this section, we present different theoretical perspectives dealing with precarity, identifying how exactly they theorise it and what sort of solutions each of them recommends for overcoming it. The theories included in that section are the Marxist, the institutionalist and neoliberal. Because of the recognised diversity within these theoretical traditions we will also endeavour to provide a rich account of the different streams of each theory.

The Marxist Perspective

For those writing within the Marxist perspective, especially in its classical version, the phenomenon of precarity is not something new since capitalism has been always based on the exploitation of workers, through the appropriation of surplus value (Allen, 2014). In that sense, the foundation of the capitalist system entails precarious existence since employees' economic survival depends on their ability to sell their labour power to employers considering that they possess nothing else

(no means of production) apart from this ability (labour power) (Marx, 1965). Intensifying the levels of exploitation and dismantling some protections that employees used to have might be captured by the term of precariousness but this does not cancel out the fundamental aspect of capitalism associated with the exploitative social relations of production (Muntaner, 2016).

In that sense, the expropriation of surplus value (unpaid labour) by employers means that employees will always be exploited regardless of the price (wage) that they receive and therefore fair treatment and justice as well as perpetual security are not applicable to capitalist employment relationships. In addition to that, capitalism has been undergoing over-accumulation crises that equate with and translate into a destruction of productive forces manifested in high unemployment rates and increasing insecurity. The decline of rates of profits and the subsequent decreasing investment activity are capitalism-led phenomena which generate unemployment (a reserve army of unemployed) as well as work intensification since workers are pressurised to work harder under the threat of high unemployment and insecurity (Clarke, 2001). The current economic crisis seems to support the above narrative as the exploitation of labour has been intensified since 2009 while an increasing number of working population are experiencing extremely precarious conditions and lack of social protection (Greer, 2016).

Besides, due to increased competition among employers, automation of production through technological advancement and reduced rates of profits due to cyclical crises, there is always a surplus of employees whose work is not needed by employers. As early as the 1990s, US-based academics, observing the effects of technological advancement and internationalisation of production on the US economy, argued that the future economic recovery will not be sufficient to

substitute for the job losses for the traditional industrial working class. Lay-offs in the US, however, have not been contained only in the traditional working-class occupations but they have also included traditional middle-class jobs since business strategies such as corporate mergers and technological innovation to increase productivity and efficiency make labour superfluous in professional and technical occupations too (Aronowitz & DiFazio, 1994, p. 4). The response available to employers and governments in that case has been to promote flexible and non-standard employment to a burgeoning number of people so that at least temporarily they are not excluded by the labour market relying on social benefits and being a potential source of social unrest. A recent Eurofound study shows that flexible contracts (mainly part-time) together with high inactivity rates observed across many EU countries are the results of the inability of EU economies to respond to the hours of work and jobs demanded by the European workforce (Eurofound, 2017a). According to this report, the labour market slack increased to almost 50 million people with the inclusion of discouraged workers – defined as those willing to work but not actively looking for a job – and involuntary part-timers. The fact that a growing number of European workers are being discouraged from participating in the labour market but not officially registered and counted as unemployed demonstrates the deeper impact of the crisis as well as the hidden dimensions of flexible work and welfare provision. The rise of the involuntary part-time work indicates the lack of sufficient growth while the rise in the number of male labour market inactivity (including those on disability benefits) shows that the decline of traditional manufacturing jobs has not been replaced by equally well-paid ones, leading many older, working-class, people to 'forced' inactivity. It has also been reported by many international organisations (ILOs) that part-time work, and especially in its involuntary version,

is associated with in-work poverty, lower social security provision and less career advancement opportunities (ILO, 2017). The fact that many workers in involuntary part-time contracts actually want to work more and secure a full-time job is probably an indication that these jobs offer limited opportunities for a transition to a full-time job (ILO, 2017).

So, although precarity would not be necessarily associated with the classical Marxist terminology, it is used as an example to demonstrate that capitalism has failed to overcome its current crisis and fulfil its promise to provide decent and secure jobs. At the same time, it has been increasingly recognised that labour market reforms since the eruption of the crisis have been mainly implemented to overcome the crisis by creating greater opportunities for profitable investments to employers or simply helping them to compete against their competitors. This process, though, is not without its own contradictions since much of the employment growth during the crisis years has been associated with non-standard employment patterns and low-paid jobs. This phenomenon has been accelerating even further the proletarisation or precarisation of a growing number of employees and shedding doubts on the growth prospects of many European economies that are based on consumer spending.

The Institutionalist Perspective

The proliferation of flexible employment contracts, associated with the inclusion of a significant number of people and especially young people to the precariat, has also been theorised by many institutionalist accounts. Being consistent with the fundamental principles of institutional theory, many researchers have attributed precarity to the neoliberalisation of the world's economy and the dismantling of regulatory frameworks and institutionalised systems of industrial

relations that were the hallmarks of the post-war modernity era (Doellgast, Lillie, & Pulignano, 2018). Leading industrial relations scholars (Baccaro & Howell, 2011) have conceptualised precarity as a phenomenon, originating from the deregulation of labour markets and employers' offensive against the very foundations of the social contract sealed off between capital and labour after the end of the Second World War. The proponents of this thesis attribute the dismantling of the post-war institutional safeguards to significant economic, political and social changes that took place over the last 30 years. The most important of those changes include the decline of unionisation, the increasing power of institutional investors through the financialisation of the economy, the competition among workers for the existing jobs produced by globalisation and the digital revolution that gives rise to new forms of work (on-demand, gig economy) (Findlay & Thompson, 2017; Kalleberg & Vallas, 2017).

This offensive has also been associated with the eruption of the crisis and the selection of neoliberal supply-side policies for re-engineering economic and employment growth. The institutional narrative suggests that such a choice has exacerbated precarity since economic growth is supposed to be materialised through greater flexibility in the labour market and less protection for workers (Crouch, 2015). Since the role of the state in regulating and stimulating the economy is waning, although in rather contradictory and disputed ways, individuals are left exposed to market forces facing a very precarious employment landscape that constantly undermines employment and social rights (Streeck, 2014b). The corrosion of national employment systems through the emerging superiority of enterprise-based agreements, over sectoral ones, constitute some of the most notable examples provided by institutionalists to explain the origin behind the precarisation since the beginning of the crisis (Heery, 2016; Marginson, 2015).

Despite the seeming similarities between Marxist and institutionalist theories on that point, we should highlight the fact that most institutionalists utilise Keynesian theoretical tools to explain economic phenomena. Therefore, for them the stagnation is the result of failed supply-side neoliberal policies that neglect the demand-side and the potentially beneficial role of the state in stimulating the economy. Institutionalists also dispute the proposition of neoliberal leaning thinking that unemployment and insecure employment are strongly linked with human capital deficits, as well as with the shortage of adequate up-to-dated skills corresponding to skills required by the information and automation era. To dispute the supply-side explanation of the crisis, many researchers that work within the institutionalist school provide evidence of an increasing number of young people with high skills and credentials whose employment prospects are circumscribed by limited demand for their skills and the outsourcing and dislocation that many businesses opt for to cut their costs (Means, 2017). In many countries of the Global South, most job openings have occurred in low-wage sectors that require limited or no education and training while prospects for financial advancement are restrained by the abundance of available and primarily cheap labour of migrant or disadvantaged background willing to do those jobs (Kalleberg, 2009).

Institutionalist accounts also question the empirical grounds that neoliberals postulate about deregulation prompting job growth and reducing unemployment. Many have argued that although deregulation gives rise to temporary jobs, there is no evidence to suggest that there is an overall increase in employment and in some cases the opposite happens. The substitution effect of temporary employment has been pointed out by scholars within this camp (Maciejewska, Mrozowicki, & Piasna, 2016) as employers tend to replace their permanent

staff with temporary ones instead of creating new positions when labour market reforms are enacted. The European Trade Union Institute for Research (ETUI) has reached a similar conclusion arguing that there is a discrepancy between the total employment growth and the hours of work as the latter has been increasing in a much slower rate than the number of newly created jobs. The data on part-time employment support the argument that jobs growth is mainly emanated from increasing the number of those in employment but reducing at the same time the volume of work. In other words, distributes the same amount of work to a higher number of people (ETUI, 2017, p. 28). Moreover, the demographic changes currently under way in EU is another variable that needs to be accounted for when considering the labour market developments as between 2008 and 2016, the working-age population of EU has declined holding back the overall unemployment rates.

A popular stream of the institutional theory argues that tackling precariousness requires an alternative policy paradigm to neo-liberalism around a more inclusive labour market approach whereby regulation is provided to both outsiders and insiders of the labour market (Rubery & Piasna, 2017). Contrary to a more radical approach, wishing to eradicate the specific forms of employment, the inclusive labour market approach targets a more socially oriented and sensitive policy that could provide less grounds for unfair results by eradicating the basis of such an exclusion (i.e. different rights or wages given to permanent and temporary employees, for example). The introduction of a basic guaranteed benefit for all unemployed people has also been proposed as a solution to precarity on the grounds that the unemployed won't be forced to accept a low-quality job if they have some social protection. Debates about the level of that support have been initiated though raising important questions regarding the effects of a guaranteed wage in

demoralising and demobilising the reserved army of the unemployed. In any case, many aspects of these accounts suffer from a reductionist approach that avoids structural features of the social system and focus on policy-making as the right tool for addressing social inequality.

It is interesting to note, however, that there is some skepticism within this camp mainly because of the inability of social democratic parties and mainstream trade unions to implement a more progressive agenda (Baccaro & Howell, 2011). The crisis management in eurozone countries, with the most exemplary cases being countries like Greece and Portugal, prove that despite anti-neoliberal predispositions and rhetoric, pro-businesses measures are prerequisites for the remaining members of the EU and also satisfying the need for economic growth as expressed by the national elites (Eleftheriou & Papadopoulos, 2018). And if the above-mentioned examples are rather exceptional because they concern indebted countries, then the example of social democratic parties in countries like France that implement neo-liberal labour market policies might be proved more challenging to those promoting this policy paradigm (ETUI, 2018). But, even theorists (Streeck, 2014b) within this tradition have become increasingly disillusioned about the possibility of social democratic principles to help overcoming the crisis of capitalism mainly because the latter suffers from rather structural crises and contradictory dynamics.

Writing within a legal-institutionalist framework, Adams and Deakin (2014) argue that precarious employment can be defined as employment that deviates from the standard employment relationship characterised by continuity, open-end nature and structured working time. These authors, along with others prior to them, argue that the best solution to non-standard work is to normalise and regulate it through a partial alignment of standard employment with that of

a non-standard one. The deregulation of the standard employment relationship might be a consequence of that process, but as Rogowski (2013) argues it is more a reflexive regulation than a deregulatory policy. In any case and despite the different framing used to construct the institutionalist alternative, this stream of institutional thinking does accept flexible employment and to some extent adopts the view that its regulation can help employees on those contracts feel more secure. The question that still remains, however, is how income inequalities and insecurity feelings linked with part-time and temporary jobs, respectively, can be resolved through a policy discourse and strategy that leave untouched the structural causes of precarious employment. To that question many institutionalist accounts reply that inequality can be ameliorated through state interventions, such as the introduction of a minimum wage (MW) and the stricter enforcement of regulation in regard to the use of flexible contracts. Concerning the first, research on the introduction of the MW in the UK has shown that the levels are rather below a living wage while at the same time employers break the impact of MW by forcing their employees to work harder and increase their productivity (Bosch et al., 2010, p. 113). As far as the second is concerned, the use of migrant workers especially in industries (retail, hospitality and processing) with very low union density levels makes it rather hard to impose labour rules as migrants are fearful to react due to their legal status and have no support by organised and collective forms of actions like unions.

The Neoliberal Perspective

The supply-side perspective has been undoubtedly quite influential over the last 30 years while despite premature

claims for its demise, due to the crisis, many postulates of the discourse inform policy-making across the EU countries (Crouch, 2015). The main postulate of this perspective is that the economic system needs to be freed from regulations and rules in order to produce optimal outcomes. This theory suggests that supply creates its own demand and, therefore, supply factors like labour should not be regulated by external factors (like the state) because in that case price distortions increase the price of labour beyond the market price at the expense of employees and the economy. The deregulation of labour markets, proposed by this theory, is supposed to respond to the needs of employers for greater flexibility yielded by organisational restructuring, technological advancement and fierce competition (Kalleberg, 2003, p. 172). The neoliberal story, embedded in a liberal discourse, resonates with an optimistic market-based scenario according to which flexible employment opens opportunities for overcoming the institutional constraints individuals faced in their attempts to find self-actualisation and freedom (Streeck, 2017). As critics have pointed out, the neoliberal idea of economic growth can be materialised under favourable conditions for investments including low taxes and higher income at the top and lower cost (labour) and social rights (benefits) at the bottom (Streeck, 2014a, p. 67). This discourse is often supported and embraced by segments of the dynamic middle class and professionals whose life trajectories and ideological underpinnings favour an individualistic explanation of success and loss with structural causes being completely out of sight. This view of the world is also employed by those interested in the perpetuation of the current social system (dominant classes and media) since it helps them create a series of expectations and rules regarding the normality in terms of behaviour and modality that even the losers should adopt. The emphasis on learning and human capital acquisition as adjustment

strategies (see below) in very uncertain times is an indicative example of the ways that social problems such as unemployment and precarious employment are atomised and turned into pathologized narratives of failed individual actions.

The ascendancy of neoliberalism in many parts of the world since the 1970s has been accompanied with a frontal attack to the foundations of the post-war political economic settlement that shielded capitalism against socialism and secured its continuity and dominance. Weakening economic growth rates and the subsequent 'legitimization' crisis manifested in the unwillingness and inability of capital to maintain its commitment to the social contract with labour has led to a withering away of the interventionist role of the state and the dominance of the market in various fields of social life (Streeck, 2014a, pp. 22–31).

Neoliberal thinking has been rather vocal in its support for educational reforms with education and more particularly human capital considered a determining factor for deciding the employment prospects of individuals. So, according to this argument, unemployment or underemployment are the results of a mismatch between the qualifications and skills of individuals and the demand of employers. In that case, insecure employment forms are seen more as the result of individual choices or at best of failed state policies that neglect the realities of the labour market producing significant skills gaps. Reporting the lack of skills in certain sectors of the US economy and the supposedly positive correlation between human capital enhancement and job creation, neoliberals envisage that the resolution to unemployment and precarity would come through education as the latter will improve marginal productivity and therefore generate demand for labour and better wages (Means, 2017, p. 4). The individual is at the centre of the neoliberal analysis as structural causes seem to occupy a secondary position in the explanatory models based

on this perspective while individuals and their alleged free will are the main units of analysis. In that case, societal problems, including precarity, become rather disconnected from economic and social structures based on and derived from social relations (for instance, capital and labour), and their management through specific policies (state policies). So, neoliberals don't problematise the social and economic context (restructuring of the economy or/and employers and state strategies to overcome the crisis) within which precarity unveils assuming instead that positive correlations exist between flexibility and job growth without consideration though about the human and social costs associated with insecure jobs.

A significant body of the neoliberal thinking in the field of labour market has concentrated on how labour market regulation distorts the function of the labour market by creating unnecessary barriers to the entry of vulnerable and disadvantaged people to the labour market (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004). It is argued that this process reduces employment outcomes and produces precariousness since it excludes labour market segments (outsiders) that could otherwise find a permanent employment even with less favourable and protected conditions. In parallel to that argument, neoliberals contend that the discrimination against the outsiders is producing unfair social outcomes and violates social justice principles as the benefits of insiders are directly derived from the losses of outsiders. Within this theoretical construct, whose empirical grounding is at most problematic, the main divide in societal and economic terms is between workers possessing different statuses and positions within the labour market. The role played by employers and the considerable benefits granted to them due to the existence of a divided workforce with significant segments in low-paid and insecure jobs is rarely debated and taken into

consideration by this school of thought (Rubery, 2011). Furthermore, many neo-liberal policy–oriented accounts have discredited the moral codes of working people by blaming family dysfunctionality and work ethic for the lack of skills and 'appropriate' attitudes that can be valued and rewarded in the new economy (McDowell, 2003, p. 39). The idea that working poor or/and precarious workers are to blame for their fortune is not particularly new since its theoretical foundation is based on individualised notions of social exclusion or 'self-blame failure' used since the Industrial Revolution (Crompton, 2008, p. 10).

Proponents of that perspective argue that the current employment protection mechanisms in place in many European countries prevented them from responding to global pressures with detrimental consequences for economic growth and competitiveness. Based on a similar line of reasoning, 'the Eurosclerosis' argument was utilised to explain the growth differences between the EU countries and the US observed in the 1990s and early 2000s (Dølvik & Martin, 2015, p. 60). Labour market rigidities including labour laws, collective bargaining institutions, social protection systems (based on no labour costs) and trade union action were held accountable for higher labour costs and increased difficulties facing companies to respond to the pressures mentioned above. The solution proposed by proponents of the deregulation thesis was the deregulation of the labour market as a means to reduce precarity and unemployment giving the opportunity to previously excluded groups to enjoy the fruits that a free market economy can generate if freed from external barriers (Rubery & Piasna, 2017, pp. 43–44).

As discussed later in the book, this discourse has been rather influential in EU policy discourse and policy levels. With the Lisbon Agenda and despite secondary differences, the objective of flexibilisation was set as a significant political

denominator that connected very diverse and unevenly developed national entities (Hermann & Hofbauer, 2007). This agenda included the following primary objectives: flexible contractual agreements, less restrictions in hiring and dismissal procedures and more decentralisation of wage-setting mechanisms. The target to balance security and flexibility was more a corrective approach rather than an ideologically different one as security was theorised as employment security (and not job security) to be achieved by secure transitions within the labour market *via* active labour market policies and training. The fate of flexibilisation agenda was determined by national settings as countries had significant differences in terms of labour market institutions, industrial relations systems, political legacy and balance of power between labour and capital. A considerable body of comparative political economy literature was developed to account for those differences proposing that reform implementation depends on a series of national-specific factors linked to institutional structures and traditions (for a review Hall & Soskice, 2003). For instance, it was envisaged that a deregulatory agenda is more likely to be introduced in the Anglo-Saxon liberal market countries where liberal labour markets and market-based coordination constitute some of the core institutional features.

THE EVOLUTION OF PRECARITY AS A CONCEPT

The First Definitions

Attempts to describe the insecurity felt by an increasing number of working people in late capitalism are not novel since scholars have tried to conceptualise the changing social and employment terrain by using concepts such as social

exclusion, informality, risk or vulnerability (Gallie, Paugam, & Jacobs, 2003; Pollert & Charlwood, 2009). The use of those terms together with others such as decent work or quality jobs was a signal of academic and political efforts to problematise the increasing marginality experienced by many working people due to limited access to secure and well-paid jobs. It was also an attempt to put forward an agenda that through specific policy actions could lead to more positive outcomes for employees. The use of those terms achieved to bring to the fore the socio-economic aspects of exclusion and marginality that had been sidelined by individualist- and economistic-oriented accounts (Munck, 2013). The policy orientation of those concepts often implies, on the other hand, that processes of exclusion, marginality and insecurity are the results of failed policies that can be corrected and reversed and not manifestations of structural forces and unequally distributed economic and political power. This is a contradiction often found in that literature since the solutions to precarity are assumed to come within the permits of the social system whose logic and operation produce this phenomenon. For that reason, some anti-capitalist discourses (see next section) have started to emerge, recognising that precarity is linked to the capitalist system and its contradictions and thus any solution to it should oppose the latter as well.

One of the definitions of precarity accepted by many scholars is the following 'precarity involves instability, lack of protection, insecurity and social or economic vulnerability … It is some combination of these factors which identifies precarious jobs, and the boundaries around the concept are inevitably to some extent arbitrary' (Rodgers, 1989). Based on the above definition many accounts on precarious employment use a series of indicators to measure the extent to which precarity has become widespread. Employment security, income, dismissal, welfare provision, duration of employment,

representation of employees, unsocial hours, working time, training provision and health and safety standards are some of those indicators frequently used to measure the extent of precarity and the number of employees that can be legitimately categorised under that term. In most occasions employees on very insecure and flexible jobs are regarded as precarious based on the very low scores they get in all the indicators mentioned above. However, as mentioned above, it is also the case that many employees on standard employment contracts have started suffering from high job insecurity, low income, hazardous health and safety working conditions, limited training, unsocial hours, overtime and absence of representation procedures in their workplace. This had led some scholars to argue that what should really concern us is the degree of precariousness rather than its existence, as in this case the variation in the degree of precariousness among different categories of workers can be recognised without losing sight of the increasing insecurity felt by most them (Dörre, 2011). In that case, the typical standard employment relationship might cease to be associated indiscriminately with non-precarious work as used to be the case in the past, offering a more nuanced and multifaceted picture of the relative deprivation, uncertainty and destabilisation experienced by many employees in the current economic climate regardless of their employment contract. An increasing number of employees find it hard nowadays to balance their family and work duties due to work intensification and irregular and non-standard working hours. The notion that many jobs – even permanent ones – are classified as bad jobs due to their association with insecure conditions raises legitimate questions about the supposed positive impact of economic growth on employment prospects (Mishel, Bivens, Gould, & Schierholz, 2012). In addition, there is a dialectic relationship between the increase in non-standard work and the precarisation felt by those on

standard employment contract as long as the latter feels under pressure to accept worse working conditions and standards under the fear imposed by those working in the same enterprise but on worse terms (Dörre, 2011).

According to Barbier, the use of the term *precariat* (precarite in French) can be traced back to the 1970s in France where scholars invented and started using the term (Barbier, 2011). It was first devised as an attempt to describe the sense of uncertainty and insecurity felt by a section of the French population and associated with multiple employment and non-employment causes including negative labour market prospects, poor housing, health problems, lack of social contacts. In later years, attempts were made to define *precariate* in such a way that the labour market dimensions of the term are stressed and empirically grounded more emphatically. The *precarite de l'emploi* was coined to signify the emergence of a group of workers employed on atypical employment contracts while the *precarite du travail* denoted a labour market condition characterised by disinterested workers, low pay and low appreciation by companies for the work of employees (Barbier, 2011, pp. 22–25). The French tradition of broadening the term continued, though, as in many accounts by dominant sociological figures, precarite was perceived as a generalised state of insecurity characteristic of a new mode of domination that underpins the late capitalist societies.

Even though the term precarity or precariat has now become a catchword that many academics and politicians can connect with in diverse national contexts, it should be noted that its accepted and widespread use in the academic world is relatively recent. As Barbier (2011) explains like any other concept with strong political connotations, precariat presupposes and implies certain social and political processes and perceptions whose exact meaning and signification are nationally embedded. He points out that public perceptions

about certain phenomena contain a normative dimension that is crucial for accounting for the ability of a term to be widely utilised in a certain context. For instance, atypical employment forms such as part-time work were perceived as atypical in France but not in the UK and the Netherlands as in the later public perceptions were rather susceptible to the use of those contracts. Similarly, in some national contexts like in Germany, the term precariat was absent from the political and academic discourses for long periods of time probably because of the greater stability in the employment relationship compared with other countries. However, as Barbier notes, the significant labour market and social protection reforms that took place in Germany in the 2000s accommodated the use of the term in the German public discourse (Barbier, 2011, p. 33). Similarly, in the UK, the use of the term came rather late as British academic and political commentators had recoursed to the concept of vulnerable workers to theorise the insecurity felt by workers. The increasing use of insecure employment contracts like zero-hours contracts and the more active role played by unions in triggering public awareness on the subject were the main factors behind the introduction of the term into the English political and academic vocabulary. In the US, on the other hand, insecurity was mainly linked with instability in relation to working hours and income. In many other European countries and in Australia, casualisation has been used to describe the increasing marginalisation of employees and the burgeoning difficulties they face to secure a stable job (Bessa & Tomlinson, 2017).

Precarity as a New Social Class?

It was Standing, however, who took the concept one step further and extended its meaning to encompass a political and class dimension that was lacking from previous conceptualisations

(Standing, 2011). He argued that precarious workers constitute a new category or class with distinctive social and economic characteristics that distinguish it from the previously well-defined and concretely categorised working class whose employment rights and work identities were rather specified and respected (Millar, 2017). His novel contribution was lying in the claim that precariat is a new 'dangerous' class or class in the making whose desperation and anger can lead to socially disruptive situations. In addition to that, Standing claimed that the class structures that emanate from the neoliberal globalised economy produces subjects (the precariat) that considerably differ from the traditional working class in their attitudes, experiences and occupational trajectories. With a rather critical tone Standing denounces the 'labourist' and traditional attitudes of the working class (proletariat) whose more secured and predictable working and social lives are a distant as well as an undesirable future for their kids, many of whom belong to the precariat. The idealised image of a distinctive working class, highly protected and secured with explicit conservative political and social characteristics that differ from the precariat, seems a bit at odds with the very precarious conditions experienced nowadays by traditional working-class communities (Allen, 2014, p. 48). The artificial distinction made by Standing between manual (traditional) working class and service (precariat) is also open to criticism since the deindustrialisation occurred in western countries has not ended the wage relationship but rather has accelerated the proletarisation of a previously more protected workforce, including a significant part of the white-collar workers.

More Recent Accounts

Although all these attempts to grasp the changing patterns of employment through the precariat concept were rather useful,

Butler's contribution highlighted that precarity refers to a more ontological and generalised feeling of insecurity that emanates from work, but it also embraces and affects almost all aspects of people's lives (Butler, 2006). The argument that Butler presented became a common ground for researchers in the fields of sociology and geography of work since the conceptualisation of precarity centred on the existential uncertainty of the human condition and less on the labour market characteristics that had been stressed by most accounts. The proponents of the above position were attracted by the critique directed towards the narrow definition of precarity provided by the ILO, according to which precarity is the outcome of a very specific form of labour management associated with the neoliberal model. This 'institutionalized' account of precarity was associated with the non-standard employment relationship with any other insecure and uncertain situations emanating either from the labour market experience or outside regarded as non-precarious.

The concept of precarity has not gone unchallenged in the literature, however, and many scholars have highlighted the negligence of historical and global processes associated with the use of the term. The critique of precarity is concentrated on two main aspects: first, insecurity has always been a part of the capitalist system since the latter is susceptible to capital's constant need to reorganise the productive forces and social relations through spatial relocations and technological advancements in its pursuit of greater efficiency, productivity and profits (Hardy, 2017, pp. 265–266). In that respect the temporary, inconsistent and unstable use of labour force is rather the dominant trend in capitalist societies rather than the norm and, therefore, the claim that precarity is something new is rather trivial. The use of precarity has also been challenged by authors because it denotes a class category – especially in its version promoted by Standing – that neglects historical and

structural dynamics. As Munck (2013) argues, classes are defined by their relation to the means of production, and since no such change has been under way, then precarity can't be regarded or theorised as a new and qualitatively different class location distinctive from other working-class people. The other point raised in many analyses is that precarity is often contrasted to a historically and geographically unique mode of employment organisation – often labelled Fordism – that is rather the exception and not the rule of capitalist development across the globe since it was based on a unique period of capitalism accompanied with very strong labour movements and the existence of socialist countries (Vosko, 2000). The prevalence of precarity in the Global South, long before the 1970s, also illustrates that insecure employment relations resembling a widespread process of precarisation have always been the normal state in these countries, while the massive concentration of western-origin capital over the last 30 years has just accelerated the proletarianisation of an increasing number of rural workers (Coates, 2010).

The attention paid to precarity also derived from a clear interest amongst critical scholars to explore how different groups experience insecure and contingent forms of employment and legal status (mainly immigrants) and what forms of resistance are being developed as a response to those suppressive situations (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson, & Waite, 2015; Strauss, 2012). The likelihood for the eruption of mobilisations amongst precarious groups like immigrants has been widely explored by researchers from various subjects since the multifaceted forms of precarity experienced by those groups are considered likely triggers for generating resistance movements (Alberti, 2014). It is not a coincidence that some authors within the precarity camp were also activists participating actively in the movements against precarity.

The tendency to ascribe the label of self-employed to many employees that work under hidden or bogus employment relations shows that concealed patterns of precarity might be widespread but not easily detected by traditional statistical sources (De Stefano, 2015). The emergence of gig economy or platform economy has raised questions around the increasing utilisation of very flexible workers, disguised under the label of 'independent contractors', that are not even classified as employees even if they are arguably dependent on one employer (Graham et al., 2017; Perulli, 2003). As the examples of Uber and Deliveroo illustrate, the working conditions in those industries together with the lack of recognised employment rights and the rather intensified and ill-defined nature of the work have been hallmarks of a life devoid of stability and security for most workers. In addition to that, the rather disguised forms of employment used in many developed and especially developing countries produce high levels of casualisation and informality, with serious consequences for workers who lack all the benefits (sick leave, paid holidays and pensions) that derive from the employee status (De Stefano, 2015). In fact, the number of self-employed people experiencing poverty is rather high, reaching almost a quarter of the labour force (ETUI, 2017). Similarly, a significant number of officially inactive people have been participating in informal and usually precarious employment that is not recorded by official statistics although it's rather widespread.

For an increasing number of researchers in the employment relation field, it is now common sense that the creation of a mass of people categorised under the precariat concept – despite the disagreements on the appropriateness of the concept – is strongly linked with the proliferation of flexible jobs and the deterioration of employment rights and conditions. Business strategies for cost reduction due to the internalisation of markets and heightened competition in product

markets along with an almost unlimited pool of cheap migrant labour are some of the factors explaining the move towards flexibilisation (Gautié & Schmitt, 2010). The turn to supply-side policies and the abandonment of demand-side management policies due to their alleged failure to prevent the economic downturn accelerated the flexibilisation of labour markets and intensified the feelings of insecurity and vulnerability that now frame many people's lives (Crouch, 2015, p. 18). Available data indicate that although unemployment and underemployment have increased in the EU, the total social expenditure on labour market intervention and more crucially income support policies has not increased (ETUI, 2017). For those in precarious jobs, the effects of the above situation are rather alarming since on the one hand social protection mechanism has been eroded due to austerity measures and public services cuts, while on other hand the economic crisis has made it much more difficult for employees to escape precarity and find a more permanent and secure job (ETUI, 2017).

The retrenching of the welfare state and the lack of care facilities also cast doubt on the argument that flexible work including part-time is a voluntary choice for many women (Jacobs & Padavic, 2015). In a recent study on the precarious work among women in the Chez Republic, Hašková and Dudova (2017) argue that the significant decline in child and elderly care services since 1989 resulted in higher levels of precarious work among women since temporary work was a necessary option to reconcile opposite and pressing responsibilities. The absence from work though in combination with individual characteristics like low educational level deprived those women from options and led them to a precarious trap from which they were unable to exit in the absence of institutional and cultural resources. The economic crisis that hit the Czech Republic and other eastern European countries

have deteriorated the position of working women with care responsibilities demonstrating clearly that individual trajectories are linked with structural changes.

LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

In previous sections we detected some significant processes that are allegedly linked to the pursuit of flexibility by employers and the pressures on employees to accept precarious employment conditions. Due to these pressures alongside the effects of the economic crisis, many countries have introduced reforms to realign their employment systems with the needs of a more unstable, competitive and crisis-stricken world. The direction of labour market reforms has been dependent on national contexts and necessities, but its content has been undoubtedly underpinned by an effort to decentralise employment systems and decollectivise the employment relationship. A parallel development in many EU countries has been the concerted effort to change employment law systems to enable the use of more non-permanent contracts and reduce the protection (against dismissals) granted to those holding more stable jobs. Many changes have also occurred in relation to social policies, with the key among them being the strengthening of activation policies and the replacement of passive measures against poverty and unemployment with market enhancing (Bonoli, 2010).

This section aims to delineate some of the most important labour market reforms implemented in European countries before and mainly since the crisis. These refer to decentralisation of collective bargaining, EPL and flexible employment contracts. After introducing these reforms, we provide specific cases from selected EU countries discussing the extent to

which the employment systems of those countries and the employment rights of those citizens have been amended due to those reforms. The following section is divided into three subsections that focus on major dimensions of labour market developments including the decentralisation of collective bargaining systems, the extension of flexible employment arrangements and the easing of dismissals.

Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining

The decentralisation of wage systems has long been presented as a prerequisite for reducing the supposed 'rigidities' of European labour markets and increasing the competitiveness of European economies. European countries are expected to decentralise the regulation of the employment relationship and strengthen company-level agreements at the expense of sectoral or occupational ones which supposedly create labour market segmentation and dualism (European Commission, 2017b). The so-called derogation of company-level agreements from sectoral ones is set to enable companies to sign agreements at company levels that are inferior to the sectoral (multi-employer) ones, reversing the established tradition and legal rule (in some countries) that company-level agreements should only deviate if they contain more favourable terms. The abolition of extension mechanisms (especially in Southern European countries) and after-effect clauses of sectoral agreement has long been perceived as a necessary change for bringing about higher flexibility to European firms. The introduction of 'clauses' according to which employers can be exempted from sectoral agreements has been another tool used to decentralise collective bargaining before the crisis erupted. Germany was one of the first countries in Europe to initiate a thorough review and modification of its collective

bargaining structures as a response to the increased pressures on manufacturing firms to improve price competitiveness against their East Asian counterparts (Carlin, Hassel, Martin, & Soskice, 2015, p. 53). Through successive labour market reforms the non-binding character of collective agreements was maintained while companies achieved local derogation from sectoral agreements with the latter influence being severely undermined. As a result, the impact of collective bargaining on wages weakened with the number of workers covered by collective agreements declined by 16 percent during the 1998–2013 period. In that sense, the decline of real wages in Germany in the period before the crisis was not such a big surprise. The Netherlands also enacted significant reforms with unions concession through social pacts, the most important of which being the delegation of many bargaining issues at company level and the more linear implementation of sectoral and company agreements with room left for individual bargaining (Afonso & Visser, 2015). Similarly, Nordic countries have moved to a more decentralised model of collective bargaining in the period prior to the crisis, albeit within a more coordinated framework than others. The moderate positions that unions took and the enduring role of social dialogue in that process were factors that facilitated this process (Afonso & Visser, 2015).

The crisis has acted as a catalyst for change since despite differences in all EU countries, employment relations and wages have come under increasing pressure. Since the crisis, EU countries have implemented reforms of collective bargaining systems with the explicit aim to reduce the extent of collectively agreed wages as well as decentralise the level (towards lower levels) that wages are negotiated and agreed. The EU has encouraged this trend through the new economic governance framework (see Euro Plus Pact and Six Pack) according to which EU member states are encouraged to

review their wage-setting mechanisms to improve their competitiveness and tackle their macroeconomic imbalances (Eurofound, 2014). According to the European Central Bank, member states need to introduce structural reforms, including the bolstering of firm-level agreements that enable wages and working conditions to respond to companies' needs (Clauwaert & Schömann, 2012, p. 39). In other cases, reforms of collective agreements were imposed on highly indebted countries as a precondition for releasing financial 'assistance' under bailout agreements.

The main changes introduced in the collective bargaining systems concern (1) the after-effect of the agreements, (2) the time that an agreement can remain in force after it has expired, (3) the extension mechanisms attached to agreements and (4) the opt-out clauses. In all cases, the primary aim of the introduced changes has been to decentralise the bargaining level, giving priority to company level and reducing the number of sectoral and occupational ones. In addition to that, the extension of opt-out clauses beyond the companies that face financial problems has been a driving force behind the extensive gap between the actual wages and the ones agreed by collective agreements. In general, decentralisation of wage-setting systems has caused a decline in wage developments in many countries, with substantial reductions in unit labour costs and salaries especially in countries mostly hit by the crisis. Additionally, collective bargaining coverage has also been reduced in most countries, and therefore, even when collective agreements are in place, the total number of those covered is significantly lowered than in the past (Bosch, 2015). The rise in in-work poverty and precarious work has been associated with changes in collective bargaining rules, especially in low-pay sectors where sectoral agreements are used to offer a buffer against employers' constant attempts to cheapen the cost of labour power (Bosch, 2015).

One result of the reforms has been the diffusion of Anglo-Saxon deregulatory employment practices in countries where collective bargaining was for long considered as a safeguard against a race to the bottom. In Romania, the government introduced the Social Dialogue Act in May 2011, bringing about significant changes to wage-setting rules, including the abolition of statutory extension mechanism and the most strict criteria for trade union representation in sectoral bargaining. Finland also introduced changes to wage-setting systems allowing firms to conclude local agreements that take into consideration crisis-related problems and deviate from sectoral ones in terms of wages and working time. In Ireland, there was a substantial change to sectoral agreement rules since the Supreme Court reestablished the criteria under which employees can be covered by a sectoral agreement. Belgium is another country that legislated changes after the crisis (2016), targeting wage-setting mechanisms that were in place since 1996 (European Commission, 2016a). France also enacted legal changes to rules governing wage setting with company-level agreement, gaining more prominence over sectoral agreements in a number of areas including working time, paid holidays and bonuses (European Commission, 2017b).

In other countries, notably the Nordic ones, local unions and employers agreed on accords that enabled firms to introduce working time and pay flexibility (Dolvik & Martin, 2015, p, 275). Similarly, in Italy, the unions (CISL and UIL) signed together with employers the reform of collective bargaining through which company-level agreements and opening clauses were introduced (Perez & Rhodes, 2015, p, 205). In Spain, there was a significant increase in company-level agreements in sectors of the economy that made very limited use of these contracts before the crisis. In Portugal the reforms resulted in a collapse of bargaining at all levels, with a significant number of workers (almost one million) not being

covered by a collective agreement since the introduction of decentralisation in 2010. In all southern European countries wages have been significantly decreased since the introduction of decentralised collective bargaining, and as a result the share of wages as a percentage of GDP has seen a decline in all countries. In other countries, most notably the Baltic ones and the Visegrad, collective bargaining was rather decentralised prior to the crisis and therefore limited initiatives were undertaken since 2010 to change existing rules.

As some have argued (Emmenegger, Hausermann, Palier, & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012), the decentralisation of the employment relationship and the abolition of legal protection for workers resulted in the creation of new precarious workers whose employment status has ceased to be protected by pre-crisis institutional leverage and legal rules. In many countries and especially in the debt-driven ones, the dismantling of collective agreements has ushered in the levering down of workers' wages and working conditions to those determined by the national collective agreements meaning that any rights, benefits and wages linked to their sector and occupation have either been lost or significantly undermined.

Employment Protection Legislation

Introducing reforms to EPL for open-ended contracts has long been regarded as a necessary component for increasing the competitiveness of the EU economies. Significant changes took place regarding the protection of employees in case of dismissal since the existing provisions were regarded too restrictive, preventing employers from adapting to the crisis conditions. Underpinned by the idea that there is a negative correlation between high employment protection and employer's incentives to invest, many documents at EU as well

as at the national level portray deregulation of the EPL as the best avenue for increasing the entrance of young people to the labour market as the cost of dismissal will be lower (Heyes & Lewis, 2014, p. 607). The main reform initiatives in EPL focused on the following policy areas: reduction of notice periods and severance pay, more extensive trial periods and simplification (easing) of procedures and rules governing collective dismissals (European Commission, 2017a, p. 72). Higher reform activity to reduce the protection for permanent workers was concentrated in countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia) that displayed higher fiscal and macroeconomic problems as well as lower scores in reforms compared with other EU countries (Germany and the Nordic countries) prior to the crisis (European Commission, 2017a). In some cases, most notably in Greece and Spain, reforms such as easing collective dismissals and making firing procedures much easier to employers were imposed by ILOs as a condition for receiving financial 'assistance' and avoiding a default. In Italy, a reform of dismissal protection was enacted in 2012 without the support of unions, while another significant change occurred in 2014 with the reform of Article 18 of the Worker's Statute (Labour Code) according to which employees could be rehired in cases of unfair dismissal (Perez & Rhodes, 2015, p. 204). In Greece with the 3863/2010 Act, severance pay and notice periods were drastically reduced, while for those employed for less than 12 months, compensation and notification do not apply. A similar development took place in Portugal albeit from a different route since the social partners there reached a national tripartite agreement according to which redundancy payment was reduced for all workers. In Ireland, severance pay was also reduced through the introduction of a new rule according to which employers' redundancy costs could be partially (15%) financed by a fund financed by employers and employees' contributions. Reforms

of severance pay, notification period and access to labour courts were also implemented in other EU countries (Denmark, Belgium, Czech Republic, Lithuania France, UK and the Netherlands), especially since employment relations had been transferred to the EU governance framework and are now subject to a continuous surveillance process (Schömann, 2014, p. 30). In 2013, France passed the Act on Securing Jobs according to which collective dismissal becomes easier. A similar development in the same year occurred in Slovenia with the government passing the revised Employment Protection Act according to which less protection is provided for permanent contracts. Belgium also passed the single status law through which notice periods for both blue- and white-collar workers are harmonised while unfair dismissal is redefined to make it easier. Croatia also reformed its employment protection favouring easier dismissals (individual and collective) and access to temporary agency work. In Lithuania, the revision of the Labour Code passed in 2016 reduced the cost of individual dismissals by shortening the notice period and reducing severance pay. It also loosened restrictions on using fixed-term contacts and introduced a number of new contract types. These include apprenticeship contracts, project-based work contracts, job sharing contracts and multiple employer contracts. In July 2015, the Netherlands introduced a cap on severance payments for unfair dismissal and provided more clarity on the routes to be followed in case of dismissal (the Public Employment Service in case of economic reasons and the courts in case of personal reasons). The maximum duration of temporary contracts was also reduced (from three to two years) and the number of months between contracts before a new chain of temporary contracts can start was increased.

Changes in EPL especially since the eruption of the crisis have resulted in higher levels of precarity for a significant number of workers in permanent and relatively stable jobs. In

countries of the South like Greece, the changes have resulted in a significant increase of the number of employees and especially young people that have very limited protection and live under the poverty line. The number of dismissals has also increased considerably, with many employers taking advantage of the favourable legislative framework. Public sector restructuring and rationalisation are also facilitated by the easing of dismissals, and for that reason in some countries like Greece the two have taken place simultaneously. Changes in EPL have also led to significant increases in flexible employment contracts as firing costs have been eliminated significantly while the extension of probation makes it much easier for employers to change their employees without any cost.

Flexible Employment Contracts

The extension of temporary employment contracts has been one of the pillars of labour market reforms pursued in many EU countries before and after the economic crisis. Many countries have attempted to induce higher flexibility by facilitating the use of new flexible contracts through legislative changes. These changes promise to offer more flexibility and less commitment for employers while for employees is supposed to function as a stepping stone for a permanent position. However, the capacity of these contracts to help employees make the transition to a permanent position has not been fulfilled, raising multiple questions about their 'real' objectives as well as impact on employees. However, promoting flexibility at the margins of the labour market has long been regarded as a worthwhile objective for EU countries since it promises to reduce unemployment and break the segmentation in the EU labour markets. The results, however, have not been equally promising with reports pointing to high

unemployment rates and increased difficulties in making the transition to a permanent job for those on temporary contracts (Avdagic & Baccaro, 2014, p. 712).

For instance, in 2007, less than three out of 10 temporary contracts became permanent, while in 2013 this number fell even further. In many EU reports, there is a recognition that working conditions, levels of pay and security and access to holidays and other benefits for fixed-term contracts are worse than those of the permanent contracts whilst it is also the case that almost one in two workers on fixed-term contracts would prefer a permanent contract. The limited predictability in terms of income and hours of work associated with many temporary contracts is another factor contributing to increased feelings of insecurity amongst those employed under those contracts.

Through the Agenda 2010 and Hartz Reforms, Germany was one of the first countries to introduce legislation to abolish or soften a series of regulations that restricted the use of atypical work. Further to the Hartz IV, schemes were introduced as means-tested social welfare provision measures ensuring that welfare recipients would be obliged to accept job offers even of lower standards as a prerequisite for not losing their benefits (Lehndorff, 2016, p. 176). In addition to that, in the early 2000s the German government implemented a deregulation agenda whose central objective was to minimise 'labour market entry barriers' using flexible employment such as fixed-term, agency work and low-level part-time work (Dølvik & Martin, 2015). Similarly, Poland is one of the EU countries where a wave of neoliberal labour market reforms adopted long before the crisis enabled the extensive use of temporary employment (Maciejewska et al., 2016, p. 234).

Since the crisis the use of flexible contracts, including temporary ones, has been facilitated by a series of labour market reforms across most EU countries. The reforms aimed

to either extend the duration that a temporary worker could be employed and/or the times that a temporary contract could be renewed. Since the eruption of the crisis all forms of atypical and flexible contracts have significantly increased in almost all EU countries although differences remain regarding the extent as well as the type of contract preferred in each national context. Research by Eurofound (2015) has found that in most EU countries temporary workers earn much less (around 19%) of what permanent workers earn. Evidence suggests that the rise in the number of non-standard work has resulted in a significant increase in in-work poverty with many workers experiencing material deprivation while being integrated into the labour market (Eurofound, 2017b).

The available data must be read with caution due to the possibility that the actual in-work poverty might have risen even further than the number suggests due to a drop in the poverty threshold emanated from falling national income levels. In any case, as data show, the percentage of 'in work at risk of poverty' has increased while when different contractual arrangements are correlated with in-work poverty it seems that part-time workers are more likely to experience poverty compared to full-time workers. The European Commission (2014) has recognised that in-work poverty has risen in the last four years in the majority of EU countries. Low-pay, job insecurity and health risks (increased stress) are not only concentrated on non-standard work but they are definitely more widespread in these workers.

In Italy, a new reform was enacted in 2012 according to which the duration of temporary contracts was extended from six to 36 months and in exceptional cases to 48 (Lang, Schömann, & Clauwaert, 2013, p. 13). New employment contracts have also been promoted by labour market reforms in a series of countries with most notable examples being the UK, Poland, Greece, Slovakia, France and Spain. The 'zero-hours

contract' is a UK-inspired very flexible type of contract whose innovative aspect rests upon the unspecified working hours and the non-guaranteed minimum pay coupled with workers waiting at home for their employers' call (Lang et al., 2013, p. 19). For instance, both Greece and Portugal increased the maximum length of fixed-term contracts from two to three years and from six months to three years, respectively.

In addition to increasing the maximum length of atypical contracts like temporary contracts, some countries (the Netherlands, Slovakia and Poland) decided to increase the amount of times that temporary contracts could be renewed (Clauwaert & Schömann, 2012, p. 11). The Spanish labour market reforms enacted in 2012 introduced a new contract, the Contrato de Emprendedores, permitting employers to employ someone for up to 12 months as a trial period before a final hiring while tax exemptions were attached for those companies retaining the employee. In France, serious protests were staged in 2016 against El Khomri reforms since the latter were to throw a severe blow to employee protection by widening the rule for collective dismissals and decreasing the financial burden of unfair dismissals (European Commission, 2016a, p. 65). The fact that labour market reforms were less widespread in some countries has been attributed to the 'internal devaluation' policies introduced in many countries prior to the crisis.

Across the EU, a significant number of newly created jobs are of temporary nature while an increase in involuntary temporary employment has also been noted. In the UK, for instance, two out of three temporary agency workers aged 20–59 would prefer a permanent employment contract if they had that choice (Grimshaw, Johnson, Rubery, & Keizer, 2016, pp. 9–10). The amount of time (in the UK almost two years) required for being entitled to employment rights including claims to unfair dismissal and statutory maternity

pay might explain why many employees prefer not to hold such jobs, whereas many employers find them as their best choice. Temporary employment is also linked with in-work poverty as countries with high numbers of atypical and temporary employment also report high incidence of in-work poverty and inequality. The Swedish reform, for instance, allows for agency workers to be legally paid less than those employed by the same employer for the same type of work.

Based on a selective reading of the effects of labour market reforms the EU regards the reduction in the strictness of EPL as the main reason for the reduction in unemployment rates and labour market segmentation observed in many countries (Spain, Portugal). The long-term effectiveness of the reforms is also outlined by the EU since it recognises that in the short term the association between labour market reforms and increased economic and employment growth might be weak or even non-existent as some evidence suggests (Estonia and Slovenia). Studies by the OECD confirm this view as the organisation has not found any evidence to support the alleged employment-generating impact of temporary work in the countries where liberalisation was implemented before the crisis. The same studies show that reforms of temporary contracts have substitution effects at the expense of permanent ones as the experience of Germany showed in the period 2005–2006 (Dølvik and Martin, 2015, p, 361).

As a result of the above, the number of non-standard forms of work has increased with negative consequences regarding pay levels and working conditions, especially for those at the lower end of the labour market. Recent studies suggest that the proliferation of flexible employment across the EU is also caused by the sluggish employment growth rates and the increasing gap between labour supply and demand. The increasing gap between total employment and total working hours worked, with the latter decreasing more

than the former signalling the inability of European economies to distribute the same number of hours to more employees (ETUI, 2017). This might explain that in many countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Cyprus, Latvia, Belgium) the number of part-time jobs that the economy generated was higher than that of full-time ones for the 2013–2016 period (ETUI, 2017).

Labour market reforms both in the pre- and post-crisis periods have led to a drastic reconfiguration of the European labour market with clear signs that flexibility is on the rise whilst the security side has been rather negatively affected (Baccaro & Howell, 2017). For European employees and especially the younger ones, this change is rather 'cosmogonic' since previous beliefs and expectations regarding their current and future employment and social lives have been rebutted in an unpresented manner and degree. The unemployment rate for those under 25 in the Euro-area countries stood at 21.2 in November 2016 while for the EU 28 the same rate was 18.8 (Eurostat, 2018). But even the older workers have experienced significant changes, with the most prominent one the realisation that the pre-crisis levels of job and income security can no longer be sustained due to the crisis and the austerity measures taken to overcome it. In addition to that both younger and older workers and their dependents are called on to survive in a very different social landscape underpinned by reduced social expenditure and heightened pressures on health, education and social security systems.

Since the eruption of the crisis all forms of atypical and flexible contracts have significantly increased in almost all EU countries, although differences remain regarding the extent as well as the type of contract preferred in each national context. In some member states (Greece, Italy, Austria, Sweden), the number of part-time work for all workers has increased, while in others (Ireland, Spain,

Portugal and Greece) the rise mostly affects the 15–24 age cohort with a significant number of employees accepting this type of work due to the lack of alternatives. Most part-time jobs have been concentrated on low-wage, low-quality and precarious employment and at the same time wage penalties and a heavily gendered dimension – women being over-represented in that category. As the British case shows, a significant number of employees – almost one in four – unwillingly find themselves in part-time work while their percentage has increased since the crisis as twice as many find it difficult to secure a full-time work compared with the pre-crisis period. In addition to that, in the same country the incidence of underemployment is rather widespread, triggering an increase in the number of employees on short-hours contracts who would prefer to work longer hours. The introduction of welfare reforms in the UK should have been included in the equation when referring to flexible employment as the last cuts in childcare credits have shown. So the question of why many women prefer part-time work should be correlated with the limited support provided by the state for those women who can only find low-paid jobs (Grimshaw et al., 2016). Studies have documented that almost half the British women work on atypical contracts and unsocial hours including shifts not because they have opted for it but rather because they are required to (La Valle, 2002).

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter offered an account of precarity presenting the main theoretical strands, definitions and political developments linked with the concept. The aim of the chapter was to highlight the diverse interpretations of precarity as well as

the diverse ways by which the concept evolved in different countries. This task was carried out by an extensive review of relevant debates of the changes that have led to the creation of a rather precarious workforce. It was highlighted that despite the agreement over the emergence of a precarious workforce, different accounts interpret and analyse this process in rather distinctive ways. Although the chapter presented different debates and theories, it was constantly stressed that structurally based discourses can explain better the contextual and economic historical factors that have led to the process that we now call 'precarization'. We argued that without understanding the structural factors behind the emergent phenomena the analysis is in danger of attributing social processes to individual choices or even worse, promising solutions to social problems like precarity without dealing with the structural causes behind their emergence. Using relevant material and studies, this part of the book demonstrated that precarious employment is not the result of a failed mix of policies or individual choices but rather an inherent feature of capitalism whose degree and form changes according to the needs and development of this social system. The institutional and neoliberal accounts were mainly criticised for their inability to associate precarity with deeper economic and social changes that force states and employers to seek policy solutions and implement strategies that damage the sense of security enjoyed by European workers in the past. The presentation of policy developments at the EU level helped the analysis to provide the changing political-institutional context within which employees experience the world of work and employers respond to heightened competition and profitability crises (including the recent economic crisis). The dismantling of traditional institutional mechanisms and collective rights together with the decline of trade union power were important factors that explain the

deterioration of working conditions and the acceleration of precarisation. The outcome of this process is the emergence of a generalised feeling of insecurity felt even by segments of the labour force that was previously in a more secured position.

2

DEFINITIONS, MEASUREMENTS AND EU EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

Following the end of the mass industrial production, towards the dusk of the twentieth century, western countries have experienced a steady decomposition of the employment relationship. Up to that point, the so-called Fordist Standard Employment model overruled, providing workers a full-time job, typically a 40-hour, during weekdays, open-ended contract. Although such an employment relationship had its drawbacks, among others, in terms of working conditions and quality of work (e.g. limited autonomy, task repetitiveness, direct supervision etc.), it was offering workers stable employment, securing them from uncertainty and the risk of job loss. In particular, the standard employment relationship intended to (1) safeguard workers from economic and social risks, (2) minimise social inequality and (3) boost economic efficiency (Bosch, 2004). The realisation of these three objectives enabled finding the middle ground between the interests of employers, employees and the society.

Nevertheless, within a relative short period of time, the norm of a stable employment relationship gave way and as Castells noted already some 20 years ago: 'the traditional form of work, based on full-time employment, clear-cut occupational assignment, and a career pattern over the lifecycle is being slowly but surely eroded away' (Castells, 1996). This phenomenon may only be seen as inevitable due to a number of factors occurring simultaneously. Some of these, as summarised by Bosch, first of all include the **flexibilisation of production**, which instead of holding massively produced stocks now require adjustment of the working time so as products and services are produced mostly to order. Thus, maintaining internal flexibility in terms of working hours is necessary as to maintain this new business model. At the same time, **female labour market participation rates** have been increasing rapidly. Such increases have been accompanied with the need to introduce flexible working patterns, especially in countries where the childcare infrastructure has been inadequate. Moreover, the **expansion of higher education** has brought up the need to allow combining education and work. Therefore, for young people, part-time and temporary jobs have become standard as these are often only seen as the first steps in one's career. Furthermore, the **rising educational levels** of the population have increased the average working times which can no longer be protected by a full-time contract. The state of the **employment levels** has also been influencing the nature of the employment relationship. In particular, at times of high unemployment and economic instability, employers are able to shift the uncertainty onto workers' shoulders, who under the fear of unemployment or dismissal are willing to accept involuntarily flexible forms of work. Finally, **labour market (de)regulation** is a very important factor determining to a large extent the nature of the employment relationship. As

an outcome of the developments presented above, a new employment paradigm has been introduced calling for the normalisation of flexible, non-standard working arrangements (Rubery, Ward, Grimshaw, & Beynon, 2005).

THE CONCEPT OF PRECARIOUS WORK

At the same time that the notion of the standard employment relationship started deteriorating, any divergence of it has been considered as precarious (Rodgers, 1989). As early as 1963, the renowned French intellectual Pierre Bourdieu used the term *précarité* pointing to the social divide that separated permanent workers from contingent or casual workers. Ulrich Beck (1992), though did not explicitly use the term precarious employment, suggested that the de-standardisation of work would eventually lead to a "risk-fraud system of flexible, pluralised, decentralised underemployment" where various forms of risky flexible forms of work are "blessed" from the employment system, creating a "risk society system of underemployment". In a similar vein, Guy Standing (2011) notes that increased labour market flexibility transferred insecurity and risks onto workers resulting to the creation of the new class, namely the so-called "*precariat*". Central to the notion of the "*precariat*" has been the lack of a secure work-based identity and not just strictly defined dimensions related to income and type of contract, which may, however, be correlated to it. In other words, in Standing's work, precarity is a status of "living in the present, without a secure identity of sense of development achieved through work and lifestyle (p. 16)". Following a similar pattern, Arne Kalleberg (2009) defined precarious work as "employment that is uncertain, unpredictable and risky from the point of view of the worker."

The above works consist some of the most influential in the discourse around precarious employment. Nevertheless, even though from a sociological perspective, the term is well conceptualised, it still remains elusive regarding the concrete elements of precarious employment. A number of studies have tried to narrow down the definition capturing aspects of paid work. Rodgers (1989) identified four dimensions, evolving around the notion of labour market insecurity. First, he defined precarious jobs as those with a brief time horizon or with a high risk of job loss, including irregular work. Second, precarious are jobs where the worker has low control (collectively or individually) of working conditions, pay level and the work pace. Third, protection, both social (e.g. access to social security benefits) and workplace (e.g. against discrimination, unjust dismissal, unethical working practices), by the means of law or customary practices are identified as aspects pointing towards precarious employment. Fourth, low-income jobs associated with poverty are also considered as determinants of precarity at work. Vosko (2010) expanded the work of Rodgers resulting in a modified list of dimensions that include (1) a degree of certainty of continuing employment (also including job tenure), (2) a degree of regulatory effectiveness (controlling for the application and enforcement of formal protections), (3) control over the labour process (including workers' mechanisms encompassing union membership and coverage) and (4) adequacy of the income package (also including government transfers and employer benefits). Following the different aspects that can characterise employment as precarious, it is made evident that a clear-cut definition is very difficult to achieve. Olsthoorn (2014) integrated the above strands of literature, attempting to capture a more accurate notion of precarious employment as threatening insecurity. To start with, he narrowed down the notion of insecurity by considering as such (1) the insecurity of the ability to secure a sufficient income and (2) insecurity as the risk of job

loss. Thus, threatening security in employment may appear when employees have limited support beyond their wage, are in low-wage jobs, suffer from job insecurity and have little access to entitlements acting as safety nets for income security. Thus, given the unavoidable overlap between income and job security he captured precarious employment as a subset characteristic of these levels and conceptualised it as "*a characteristic of the employment relationship, i.e. as insecure jobs occupied by vulnerable employees, who can expect few entitlements to income support when unemployed*" (p. 424). Therefore, understanding precarious employment is important to link vulnerable workers (i.e. workers that due to their individual characteristics are expected to suffer from the conditions of precarious employment) to insecure jobs (i.e. job elements that make an employment precarious) and unsupportive benefits (limited rights that employees derive from the employment relation). Finally, Olsthoorn (2014) concluded that "*precarious employment refers to employment relations that are precarious for the employee, while precarious employees and the precariously employed refer to employees in an employment relation that is precarious for them*" (p. 424).

TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AND PRECARIOUSNESS

Following the absence of a universal definition of precarious employment, measuring its real extent is an even more challenging task. A standard approach has been to measure precarious employment, expressed through non-standard contracts and typically through temporary ones. To a certain extent this is within reason as non-standard workers are considered as worse off in the labour market compared to their counterparts on standard contracts. For instance, temporary workers are found to face a wage penalty just for not being in

permanent contracts, which penalty is not attributed to their individual characteristics but to certain "discrimination" in the labour market (Comi & Grasseni, 2012). At the same time, non-standard contracts (i.e. part-time, temporary and fixed term) usually suffer from "bad job" characteristics including low pay, absence of pension and sick pay and limited career prospects (McGovern, Smeaton, & Hill, 2004), which are aspects of employment precarity. Moreover, workers on "flexible" contracts (i.e. temporary, part-time and union coverage) are found to be considerably less likely to be involved in work-related training to strengthen their skills (Arulampalam & Booth, 1998). As a result, and as Barbier (2011) notes, research on employment precariousness has been overwhelmed by measuring the level of job permanency, typically using data from large-scale surveys, such as the Labour Force Survey or the Working Conditions Survey, where it is explicitly measured whether the individual holds a permanent job or not. Nevertheless, however strong might be the links between temporary employment and precariousness, due to the factors outlined above, it still consists of a very heterogeneous group and as Frade, Darmon, and Laparra (2004) note in one of the first studies ever trying to capture precarious employment "to depict whether precarious employment exists, it is important to analyse which types of temporary contracts can be regarded as reflecting precarious employment". In particular, a number of reasons may lie behind taking up a temporary job. These reasons are summarised, in some detail, below.

Temporary Employment as a Signal

Optimal employment contracts, where utility functions of employees and employers are jointly optimised, are usually impossible to reach due to informational asymmetries. Spence (1973) proposes a model according to which firms are unable

to observe workers' skills and capabilities in a perfect manner. In absence of any signal, firms offer employment based on the average expected productivity of workers. In such cases, some highly skilled workers will be underpaid while some low skilled ones will be overpaid. In order to avoid this situation, highly skilled employees have an incentive to find a way to signal their productivity to their perspective employers.

The most typical way of signalling hidden skills and capabilities is education (Spence, 1973). Degrees and credentials are common mechanisms workers use to demonstrate their ability to perform certain jobs and tasks. However, it is also argued that previous temporary employment may be seen as a positive signal regarding the capabilities of job applicants. This "*stepping-stone*" interpretation of temporary employment suggests that temporary contracts may help to reduce informational asymmetries and improve the matching process between jobs and candidates (Ichino, Mealli, & Nannicini, 2008). Furthermore, Graaf-Zilj, Van den Berg, and Heyma (2011) argue that the experience gained over a temporary contract acts as a signal of individuals' ability and motivation. In particular, a past temporary contract on the one hand ensures a certain levels of skills acquired over that period, while on the other hand acts as a signal of career devotion. For instance, Van den Berg, Holm, and Van Ours (2002) observe that being a temporary medical assistant acts as a positive signal for those interested in developing a medical career. Van den Berg et al. (2002) stress that temporary employment may be a good signal if firms accept that workers with past experience (even in fixed-term contracts) have already shown their capacity and interest to work under organisational rules. In the same line, Von Hippel, Mangum, Greenberger, Heneman, and Skoglind (1997) argue that temporary employees are interested in gaining experience and relevance by the means of a fixed-term employment contract. However,

Amuedo-Dorantes, Malo, and Muñoz-Bullon (2008) note differences between temporaries hired through a temporary help agency and those hired directly by firms, with the latter enjoying a higher likelihood of eventually signing a permanent contract.

Temporary Employment as a Screening Mechanism

A temporary employment could also serve as a period during which the employer can screen employees' skills and capabilities. While in signalling, the informed agent (worker) makes a move first by revealing his or her credentials; in screening mechanisms, the uniformed agent (firm) tries to learn as much as possible about the employee (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005). Various examples of screening systems are used in different labour markets. Ability tests, probation spells and job interviews are among others designed to learn about workers' abilities and traits.

Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek (2004) argue that temporary contracts are a useful way of allowing the firm to screen candidates' qualities before offering permanent positions. In particular, firms looking to hire permanent staff believe that offering a permanent contract to a candidate with unknown skills and capabilities is both risky and costly as in the event that the firm is not happy with its choice then it will have to bear a high cost of terminating a permanent contract. According to that theory, firms in order to avoid such cases prefer to offer a probation spell so as to observe the candidate's performance. Doing so, firms reduce significantly informational asymmetries. Moreover, probation periods could act as a sorting mechanism since firms consider that workers who are really interested in working for them often accept the less appealing conditions of a temporary contract (Loh, 1994).

In practical terms, screening temporaries' performance has been investigated by several studies including Engellandt and Riphahn (2005). Their evidence suggests that since temporary workers need to pass employers' screening they agree to work more hours while they are also less likely, than permanent workers, to be absent from work. Moreover, the same authors stress that temporary employment is more useful to screen unemployed than employed candidates, as levels of asymmetric information are higher for the unemployed. In this line, De Cuyper and De Witte (2010) find that temporary employees try harder (than permanents) to cause a positive impression on managers and supervisors. In other words, temporary employments are somehow aware of being screened and therefore they act in consequence. To elaborate, by using temporary contracts as a screening mechanism firms could learn about candidates' skills and motivation and, thus, decide whether they qualify for a permanent position on that basis.

Temporary Employment as a Flexible Contract

The third theory explaining the reasons for being in temporary employment sees a non-permanent contract as an opportunity. Firms and workers are required to respond and adapt to the rapid changes of the economy and the labour market. On the one hand, firms are reluctant to offer the set of traditional employment conditions according to which capable and responsible workers were offered "employment for life". On the other hand, new challenges are brought to workers who, in the absence of paternalistic-type protection from their firm or the state, need to take responsibility for their career (Gallunic & Anderson, 2000). In particular, workers need to be aware of their employability and maximise the human capital gained from their employers (Urtasun & Nuñez, 2012).

Becker (1983), the founder of the Human Capital Theory, points out that employment security now rests in the adequate development and maintenance of individual's human capital. Workers will, therefore, appraise the value of skills and capabilities they acquire in each firm. Gaining firm-specific human capital, therefore, will be less attractive as employees may prefer to acquire more general human capital in order to "sell" it to other firms in the future (Gallunic & Anderson, 2000). Thus, commitment to a specific firm or source of human capital may be a risky strategy and could harm workers' employability and their future employment prospects. In these circumstances, accepting rigidities associated to a permanent contract may be less attractive. Thus, temporary employment could benefit workers who are willing to develop their human capital and improve their employability as well as those who may use temporary employment to examine the firm without commitment (Von Hippel et al., 1997).

Nevertheless, the choice of temporary employment is more appealing to specific types of workers. For example, younger rather than older workers are more committed to develop their human capital, thus being interested in temporary employment, as the level of their employability will determine their future careers. On a similar vein, Morris and Vekker (2001) find that some workers, particularly students, may choose temporary employment seeking greater schedule flexibility. Moreover, less risk-averse workers (i.e. consultants, commercial agents, independent advisors *etc.*) would be interested in flexible employment relations as they may prefer to develop their careers in external labour markets rather than committing to a unique firm by signing a permanent contract.

The key point of the above is that career models based on employability, rather than on job security, are becoming increasingly popular. In particular, it has recently been observed that some workers are voluntarily choosing forms of

non-traditional employment, which are known as boundaryless careers (Forrier & Sels, 2003). Marler, Barringer, and Milkovich (2002) classify temporary workers in two types: new and traditional. The new temporary workers are highly skilled and employable and, therefore, do not suffer from the uncertainty linked to temporary contracts. Workers of this profile may, therefore, choose temporary employment as a source of flexibility for the development of their careers.

Temporary Employment as a Friction of the Market

The final cause of temporary employment relates to rigidities in the labour market. Labour markets are unable to match perfectly workers' preferences and firms' needs due to the inadequate distribution of skills, informational problems and geographical rigidities that cause "frictions", such as unemployment and precariousness (Pissarides, 2000). In particular, these frictions are more likely to happen in a fast changing environment since firms are interested in managing their human resource function with more flexibility (Kathuria & Partovi, 1999) that inevitably creates more uncertainty regarding job offers and employment conditions.

The changing environment in the labour market leads firms to be more reluctant to guarantee permanent employment. Instead, they offer temporary contracts and less permanent positions. The replacement of traditional forms of career development within the firm is, therefore, imposed upon workers (Raider & Burt, 1996) and is usually interpreted as the intensification of precariousness in employment conditions (Felstead & Gallie, 2004). On the other hand, workers prefer long-term and secure, rather than short-term and risky, contractual arrangements (Zaleska & de Menezes, 2007). Moreover, the syndicate theory states that individual workers

are generally more risk-averse than firms since the work effort is more difficult to diversify than the capital invested in shares (Wilson, 1968). Permanent (less risky) contracts are, therefore, preferred among risk-adverse workers. However, these contracts are now more difficult to find, as firms' preference for avoiding contractual bounds, and increasing flexibility, is more intense (Kalleberg, 2009). As a result, many workers are pushed to accept less preferred employment conditions. In particular, some workers looking for a permanent contract have to accept temporary employment in order to avoid unemployment. Hippel, Mangum, Greenberger, Skoglind, and Heneman (1997) find that 70% of temporary workers in the US belong to this category of "permanent temporaries". Marler et al. (2002) also stress that this "traditional" contingent work is associated with different work attitudes and behaviour. This type of non-willing temporary employment may, therefore, reduce workers' wellbeing as job insecurity and limited employability affect negatively their utility functions. In general, this type of temporary employment is the one that can be interpreted as a precarious form of employment that brings consequences such as those described above.

Therefore, as it can be made obvious from the above, grouping all temporary workers together and considering them as precarious, as many studies have assumed, is far from an immaculate measure. On balance, identifying those regarded as "victims" of frictions of the labour market can be closer to the desired measurement.

MEASURING PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT

The discourse around precarious employment has been growing fast at both a policy level and the academic literature,

especially since the burst of the economic crisis. As a result, capturing its real extent can be seen as desirable as ever. However, the development of a universal, "plug-in and play", measurement of precarious employment is hindered by a number of factors. First of all, there is no consensus on the definition of precarious employment. Scholars from different disciplines, and often within the same discipline, propose their own definition, often decomposing definitions proposed by others. At the same time, at the policy level the term is often used in a critical perspective which blurs any attempts to measure it further. Second, the nature of precarious employment itself is multidimensional and thus cannot be captured solely focussing on one dimension (e.g. job characteristics) without considering other dimensions (e.g. individuals' risks, such as access to social rights). Third, and linked to the other two reasons, however detailed definitions are being developed, the data available will always be lacking behind on some aspect. For instance, activities occurring in the 'shadow' economy are typically not covered statistically, deflating thus any attempt to measure the extent of precarious employment. Moreover, new types of working patterns emerge, expanding the coverage of precarious employment, such as the "zero-hour" contracts which, however, are often not captured in the statistics or are captured with time-delay until when new forms may have appeared. Finally, measuring precarious employment at a comparative European level is even more challenging as a common definition and dataset need to be used. In fact, the coverage of European data, such as the European Union Labour Force Survey, is narrower than the country-level Labour Force Surveys which may allow for more in-depth analysis but only for individual countries.

The growing interest around precarious employment has led to the development of a number of approaches in studying it. A recent study conducted for the European Parliament

(2016) identified three main approaches in relation to the risk of precariousness in the employment relationship.

The Individual Contracts Approach

This has been the most common approach adopted so far in both theory and empirical work. In general terms, it has been considering any type of non-standard work as precarious. The underlying concept of this approach is that the risk of precariousness can be captured by estimating the numbers of people working in non-standard contracts. Non-standard jobs can include an array of employment relationships, such as part-time, temporary, self-employment, outsourced or subcontracted, internships, uninsured and undeclared, zero-hour contracts etc. However, the majority of studies have been focussing on temporary employment; though this has been extended in order to include part-time work as well as other atypical forms of employment, such as nightshifts, working on weekends and overtime work. In the US, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has introduced the concept of contingent workers capturing, through dedicated surveys (i.e. the Contingent Worker Survey), those "who do not have an implicit or explicit contract for ongoing employment" (2005), typically identified as independent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency workers and workers provided by contract firms. In a similar manner, the RAND American Life Panel has initiated the term "alternative work arrangements" (Katz & Krueger, 2016) but in essence has captured a similar group of workers (i.e. temporary help agency workers, on-call workers, contract workers, and independent contractors and freelancers).

On the one hand, it is well-argued that such employment contracts do not secure workers against certain risks, such as weak professional development (Arulampalam & Booth,

1998), low income (Comi & Grasseni, 2012), bad job characteristics (McGovern et al., 2004) and fewer benefits (Houseman et al., 2004). However, even though measuring the share of non-standard employment can be able to point towards a certain direction, it can only be considered as a crude measurement, largely due to its heterogeneous nature and especially when it comes to temporary contracts as it was demonstrated in some detail in the previous section. For instance, since temporary employment is documented to be in a position to redeem one's future (Gash, 2008), considering it as precarious cannot be safe.

On the other hand, certain types of atypical contracts can be considered as a safer approach to precarious employment as they are found to have negative effects on individuals' health. For instance, night and shift work is associated with a negative effect on health and increased absenteeism (Harrington, 2001). The key point of the above is that even though it is important to consider non-standard work while studying precarious employment, basing the analysis on such a measurement alone may lead to overestimations of the real extent of the phenomenon. At the same time, it is important to consider not only the type of contract that one possesses but also the institutional setting, which can influence the real extent of precarious employment. In particular, as Kalleberg (2014) notes, there are relatively small numbers of temporary help agency workers in the US and the UK. However, this is not to signal that precarious employment remains at low levels. On the contrary, due to the relative ease of hire and fire, firms are in a position to hire workers in regular contracts with the intention to only use them for short periods of time (with workers not being aware of this issue). Thus, in countries where labour protection remains at low levels, a certain extent of precarious employment may be hidden under normal contracts.

The Individual Choice Approach

This approach bases the precarious element in the judgement of the individual about the employment relationship they are in. On the one hand, it does entail a subjective element and can, thus, be vulnerable to criticism; however, it does provide indication of precariousness as the individual provides a clear indication about the reasons behind his or her employment condition and in essence overcomes the problems of the contracts approach that does not consider the motives of individuals but assumes that all feel the same about their employment. In particular, the recent elaboration of datasets, such as the Labour Force Survey, and the inclusion of elements behind the reasons of non-standard work allows capturing aspects such as involuntary temporary and involuntary part-time employment. In fact, a number of studies have investigated the appearance of involuntary non-standard employment, using both national (Green & Livanos, 2015) and European contexts (Green & Livanos, 2017).

However, the subjective nature of this measurement cannot exclude the possibility that regardless of the response, the individual still prefers the non-standard work that he or she is currently in and not the same job in a standard format due to reasons such as its working conditions (Fleetwood, 2001). At the same time, non-standard contracts, such as temporary work, may lead to a development of a psychological immune system that neutralises the negative effects and even rationalises the current situation (Pouliakas & Theodossiou, 2010). However, even such cases provide an indication about the negative aspect of such jobs pointing towards precariousness and are not included in the measurements without reason.

The individual choice approach can also capture the level of cognitive insecurity the individual feels by investigating

whether one is looking for a job due to the prospect of losing the current position one is in (Kretsos & Livanos, 2016). The criticism of this approach lies around the argument that one may not feel insecure even though at the same time is looking for a job because of positive employment prospects. As can be seen from the above analysis, the individual choice approach not left without critique, however, has elements close to the theoretical perspectives of precarious employment.

The Quality of Work Approach

A third approach, which does not explicitly aim to study precariousness, but whose measures are clearly associated with it, is that of job quality. In particular, over the last few decades, the concept of job quality has attracted considerable conceptual and academic interest. At a policy level, the issue of job quality was introduced to the agenda in 2000 where the Lisbon Council put forth the objective for more and better jobs for everyone. As a result, in 2001 the European Commission (2001) provided a framework, choosing 10 dimensions of job quality. Such indicators include (1) intrinsic job quality; (2) skills, lifelong learning and career development; (3) gender equality; (4) health and safety at work; (5) flexibility and security; (6) inclusion and access to the labour market; (7) work organisation and the work–life balance; (8) social dialogue and worker involvement; (9) diversity and non-discrimination and (10) overall work performance. Since then, other organisations such as the ILO[1] and the OECD (2016) have analysed the issue of job quality, proposing their own dimensions and measurements. The International Labour Organisation defines decent work as that which "involves

[1] http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang–en/index.htm.

opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns and treatment for all women and men". The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has captured job quality by analysing three main elements: (1) earnings quality, (2) labour market security and (3) quality of working environment. More recently, the ILO (2017) has used the concept of vulnerable employment including own-account work and contributing family employment.

Looking at the indicators included in such measures, one can say that the discourse of job quality can be considered as the predecessor of that or precarious employment. In fact, Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson (2000) examined "job quality" characteristics of non-standard employment contracts while this research agenda focused on precarious employment about a decade later (Kalleberg, 2009). At the same time, the ILO (2017) acknowledges that "vulnerable forms of employment are typically subject to high levels of precariousness". Therefore, it is difficult to disassociate bad jobs from precarious employment, and thus this area of research can be very useful in understanding better precarious employment.

The Individual Risk of Precariousness

The approaches outlined above capture the threat of employment security given the characteristics of the employment relationship that an individual is in. However, it has been argued (Olsthoorn, 2014) that without considering the severity of the threat (e.g. of dismissal), the real extent of precariousness is actually miscalculated. In particular, Olsthoorn (2014) argues that in instances where the employee is in a precarious job "by choice" then the label precarious is

actually misplaced. For instance, a wealthy employee or one that is safeguarded by collective agreements or/and generous government benefits may actually fear much less threat imposed by the employment characteristics than one coming from a poor environment and/or one that is not protected by the institutional framework. Following this line of argument, Loughlin and Murray (2013) introduced the concept of job status congruence, i.e. the extent to which people are working, full-time, contract or part-time, "by choice" and examined its links and effects to job quality. Their research explicitly indicated that job status congruence is less related to negative mood and more affective organisational commitment. At the same time, lack of congruence is likely to lead to problems in one's personal life. For instance, employees that are "forced" to take up full-time jobs due to lack of financial means, however, at the expense of their preferred personal time are likely to be affected in terms of mental and physical health. In other words, an otherwise preferred contract (i.e. full-time) may actually be considered as precarious if it occurs involuntarily. To sum up, as Olsthoorn (2014) argues, "not integrating the dimensions on the individual level jeopardises conclusions regarding individuals' precariouness". Therefore, aside from the investigation of job characteristics, the incidence of precariousness cannot be studied aside from issues related to the individual risk that is linked to issues such as low pay, social security and labour rights.

OUTCOMES OF PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT

The lack of a concrete measure of precarious employment makes it even more difficult to assess its impact. Nevertheless, however precarious employment is defined and measured, most studies evolve around its adverse effects on the individual

regarding both working conditions and impact on health. For instance, when looking at non-standard workers (e.g. temporary, part-time), the evidence suggests that such workers are often subject to physical discomfort (e.g. handling heavy loads, engaged in repetitive hand movements and tiring positions) and are exposed to hazardous substances, commercial pressure (e.g. very tight deadlines, low margins of discomfort) and heavy pressure regarding the pace of work (Letourneux, 1998). Similar findings are established even when looking at a more narrow definition of precarious employment. For example, Benavides, Benach, Diez-Roux, and Roman (2000) defined precarious employees as those who work in unstable jobs with low work control, low income and social protection and found that such workers are more likely to be less satisfied with their work while being more exposed to fatigue, backache and muscular pains. These results were also confirmed by subsequent research (Benach, Gimeno, & Benavides, 2004). However, precarious workers were found to show lower levels of work absenteeism. This could be related to the fact that workers in unstable contracts are "in fear" of being absent to work where research has shown that once being absent they would tend to be off sick for a longer period of time (Livanos & Zangelidis, 2013). However, narrower measures of precarity also point towards similar findings. For instance, evidence suggests (Kauhanen & Natti, 2015) that employees who are in non-standard jobs involuntarily are associated with lower overall quality of work defined as opportunities for skills development, autonomy at work, job discretion and job insecurity when compared to those who are in non-standard contracts for other reasons (e.g. increased flexibility, career progress etc.). Moreover, even a more complex approach adopting the concept of "employment strain" and combining dimensions related to employment uncertainty, job search activity and support on the employment relationship pointed,

at a broad level, towards a similar direction (Lewchuk, Clarke, & Wolf, 2008), suggesting that precarious employment is related to poor health conditions (e.g. pain at work, overall poor health, stress, frustration, headaches etc.).

As can be made obvious from the above, precarious employment, however, is clearly associated to inferior working conditions and job quality while it has negative impacts on health. Nevertheless, establishing the exact links would need further investigation by engaging in very detailed studies about not only aspects of precarious employment but also on health outcomes. Health aside, the rise of precarious employment may have other negative effects in one's life. For instance, a study in Australia (Woodman, 2012) showed that youngsters that are keen to combine study with new, precarious types of employment, that are now increasingly available, find it difficult to cope with their personal life and often to maintain close friendships and build new acquaintances. As far as career progression is concerned, taking up unrecorded/unpaid placements at the early stages of the career may jeopardise one's career track, leading to precarious pathways of employment (Purcell & Tzanakou, 2016). On the one hand, this situation could change in the course of one's life; however, from a labour market perspective, once youngsters enter the world of work, in the absence of collective work organisation, they may find it more difficult to be exposed to the networks required for a successful career, leading them to end up living a precarious life (Wilson & Ebert, 2013). Therefore, precarious employment may have a snowball effect on various aspects such as housing stress, political detachment and overall marginalisation (Wilson & Ebert, 2013). In fact, as recent evidence (Livanos & Nuñez, 2017) suggest, the involvement of older workers in precarious positions is likely to lead them into a precarious retirement in the sense that they will retire later than those engaged in more standard jobs.

EXISTING STUDIES MEASURING PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT

The discourse around precarious employment and its conceptualisation has inevitably been followed by the need to provide concrete ways of measuring it. Thus, over the last few years there have been a few contributions putting forth a set of dimensions on which individual indicators as well combined ones can be based for capturing precarious employment. One of the first studies ever at a European level, conducted for the European Commission (2004), in view of the multidimensional nature of precarious employment, has used a variety of job-based indicators so as to examine its extent in a comparative manner across countries. The dimensions proposed included (1) low income band, (2) job tenure less than a year, (3) fixed or temporary agency contract, (4) low intellectual job content, (5) low degree of autonomy at work, (6) harassment during the last 12 months, (7) working unsocial hours and (8) bad physical environment. In a similar manner, Leschke and Keune (2008) defined three dimensions of precarious employment: (1) low pay, (2) very short or long working hours and (3) temporary contacts and proposed that an employee is precarious if he or she fulfils at least two of these dimensions. More recently, a study for the European Parliament (2016) adopted two analytical axes looking at both factors of the employment relation (e.g. type of contracts etc.) as well as the individual risk of precariousness (access to social rights etc.), without, however, proposing a single measurement of precarious employment. Vives et al. (2011) utilising data from Spain (i.e. the Psychosocial Work Environment Survey) introduced the Employment Precariousness Scale by examining a total of 26 items of the employment relationship. These have been grouped into six dimensions covering (1) temporariness, (2) disempowerment,

(3) vulnerability, (4) wages, (5) rights and (6) capacity to exercise rights. A global score has been devised estimating the prevalence of precarious employment via a three-category scale (none, low-moderate and high precariousness). Following a similar logic, Bazillier, Bacoc, and Calavrezo (2016) looked into a number of work characteristics and using data-reducing techniques derived two dimensions of employment vulnerability: (1) the employer-related vulnerability index and (2) the job-related vulnerability index. Puig-Barrachina et al. (2014) utilised a wave of the 2005 European Working Conditions Survey in order to estimate the levels of precarious employment in Europe (EU27) by estimating 11 indicators of a total of eight dimensions: (1) employment instability, (2) low income level, (3) lack of rights and social protection, (4) incapacity to exercise rights, (5) absence of collective bargaining, (6) imbalanced interpersonal power relations, (7) lack of training and (8) low control over working time.

Approaches such as the ones presented above are expansive and capture various elements of work that can point towards precarious employment. However, some scholars consider these too broad and possibly detracting from the essence of precarious work. For Kalleberg (2014) precarious work should relate to (1) the extent that work is unstable, uncertain and insecure and (2) whether workers are subject to opportunities for advancement at their current jobs. Olsthoorn (2014) working on data from the Netherlands identifies two elements of precarious employment that need to be investigated. The first relates to insecurity regarding income sufficiency and the second to insecurity regarding job stability. Regarding the first, it is proposed that an employee has a precarious income only if three conditions are fulfilled at once; these are that the employee have (1) a low income, (2) low supplementary income and (3) few benefit entitlements. As for

the second, it is argued that someone is precarious if he or she has (1) a non-permanent contract and (2) a long expected duration of unemployment. These two indicators are investigated separately but also at once so as to fully capture the real extent of precarious employment.

Kretsos and Livanos (2016) investigated the extent and determinants of precarious employment in EU15 by utilising data from the European Union Labour Force Survey and looking into non-standard contracts (temporary and part-time) that are taken up involuntarily and job insecurity in a single framework isolating the "lack of choice" element of the employment relationship. Moreover, a number of other recent studies have focused on differences between voluntary and involuntary temporary workers using microeconomic data. For instance, Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008) studied the Spanish labour market and found that workers in temporary employment, many of whom are there involuntarily, have limited chances of career advancement. Skedinger (2011) investigated the impact of employment protection in 20 EU countries and concluded that greater stringency of employment regulations for 'regular' work is associated with higher involuntary temporary employment. Using data from the 2010 UK Labour Force Survey, Cam (2012) found that involuntary part-time status is more frequently observed among males and single women. Nunez and Livanos (2015) investigated the causes of different types of temporary employment in Europe and found that women, younger individuals, singles and non-nationals were more likely to be in temporary employment than their counterparts because they could not find a permanent contract, rather than being "temps by choice". In a similar comparative manner, Horemans, Marx, and Nolan (2016) focused their research on involuntary part-time work across EU member states, assessing its implications for poverty risk. Moreover, a recent

study for the European Parliament (2016) assessed different types of employment and how these are connected to work precarity. The study concludes that involuntary part-time work is linked to relatively high levels of precarious employment (captured by a wide variety of indicators, notably in-work poverty and low pay) due to various reasons, including the less-than-desirable levels of income. Finally, in a relevant comparative study Veliziotis, Matsaganis, and Karakitsios (2015) investigated the incidence of involuntary part-time employment in Greece and the UK, concluding that rising levels observed in the post-crisis years can be attributed mostly to an economic trend effect. Nevertheless, important socio-demographic and job composition effects are also evident in their analysis. As the authors focused on the immediate time period (2008–2013) in which the Greek economy was exposed to the economic downfall, they observed that the determinants of involuntary part-time employment in the country were subject to greater 'noise' than in the UK. Finally, Green and Livanos (2015), grouped involuntary part-time and temporary contacts into a unique measure of involuntary non-standard employment (INE) and, subsequently, investigated the impact of the economic crisis on INE across regions in the UK. The same authors have extended their research to six European countries with distinctive labour market characteristics (Green & Livanos, 2017).

APPROACH AND MEASUREMENTS UTILISED

Having carefully examined the literature and most of the existing studies, this book has adopted a holistic approach in measuring precarious employment. In particular, our departure point of analysis has been that no universally

accepted definition or measurement of precarious employment can be achieved. Therefore, any suggested measure may be incomplete and subject to criticism. However, in this book an attempt has been made to capture the main concepts discussed in the literature characterising a job as precarious. In order to operationalise our approach we have utilised data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), which consists of one of the most important surveys for socio-economic research in Europe. Using a Pan-European survey allows applying the measures developed across all member states using harmonised data and classifications, thus enabling cross-country comparisons. The EU LFS is a household-level survey designed to gather information on the labour conditions of EU residents. The survey contains data on demographic characteristics, education, labour market status, first job and flexible working patterns, second job, previous employment and job-seeking methods. The EU LFS, conducted by the national statistical agency of each member state under the guidance of EUROSTAT, is widely considered to provide reliable information due to its large sample size and sampling methods adopted. The EU LFS is a household survey answered by individuals so it is subject to subjectivity as it is the case with any survey.

Utilising this dataset, it has been made possible to identify a number of aspects in the employment relationship that can point towards precariousness. Our approach is not to combine different aspects into a unique measurement but to adopt a multidimensional framework and then look at common factors associated with the intensity of precarious employment.

The main aspects to be examined are presented here; however, more specific technical details about the construction of the variables and the data used are presented in

subsequent section. In total, six areas of paid employment are being examined.

Contract Precariousness: This category conceptualises precariousness as the lack of contractual stability or employment security, traditionally expressed by full-time, permanent contracts. In particular, while most studies focus on non-standard forms of employment irrespective of whether it occurs voluntarily or not, in this category only those individuals that have explicitly stated that they are in temporary or part-time employment involuntarily (i.e. they could not find permanent or full-time work) are included. Thus, two separate measures have been developed (i.e. involuntary part-time and involuntary temporary), capturing the "lack of choice" element of such otherwise flexible working arrangements.

Unsociable Hours Precariousness: One of the main aspects of precarious employment is that of the so-called "unsociable hours", which is often accounted for the detrimental effects to one's health and wellbeing. Such an aspect is measured by three variables. The first relates to whether the individual is regularly engaged in evening or night work. The second one identifies those employees that are repeatedly involved in Saturday or Sunday work. The third measures whether the usual hours of work in the main job is significantly higher than the average for the occupational group.

Institutional Context Precariousness: This category aims to account for the extent that the individual is protected/facilitated by the institutional context. Two measures have been possible to develop under this category. The first one includes workers who are often engaged in unpaid overtime, which is a signal of lack of access to employment rights. The second includes recently employed workers for whom the Public Employment Services (PES) had no involvement at all in helping them in their current employment. This

measurement is again a signal of the extent the institutional framework facilitates the transition to employment.

Income Precariousness: Income insecurity is another key aspect of precariousness as on the one hand, it indicates the ability of a worker to "escape" poverty in the case of an eventual job loss, while on the other hand signals whether a minimum standard of living can be achieved. The measure developed is based on whether the income that the individual receives from the main job is significantly lower than that of the average of the detailed occupational group.

Insecurity Precariousness: The literature on employment insecurity includes various measures such as the extent of employment stability (e.g. flexible contracts) or possible unemployment in the case of a lay-off. The approach adopted in this book (given that employment stability is already captured by another measure) focuses on whether the individual feels "safe" in his/her current job. In particular, it measures whether an individual is looking for a job because he or she feels the risk or uncertainty of losing their present job.

Job Context/Working Conditions Precariousness: The sixth dimension developed for measuring precarious employment focuses on the job context. Two measures are included within this dimension. The first captures the extent that the individual's skills are matched at the workplace. In particular, it adopts an established measurement of mismatch by estimating whether the individual is employed at a medium- to low-skilled occupation while the individual possesses a high level of education. The second one focuses on whether the working conditions of the current job have led the individual into looking for another job.

The following table presents details on the indicators included in each dimension as well as on the way these have been constructed utilising the EU LFS data.

Dimension	Indicators	Construction	Notes
Contract	Involuntary part-time	Part-time = Yes Reason for part time: "Person could not find a full-time job"	Both measures are applied to only those in paid employment, excluding thus the self-employed, family member workers etc.
	Involuntary temporary	Temporary = Yes Reason for temporary: "Person could not find a permanent job"	
Unsociable hours	Evening/night work	"Person usually works in the evening"	
	Saturday/ Sunday work	"Person usually works on Saturdays/ Sundays"	
	Long usual hours of work	Long hours are measured as those exceeding more than one standard deviation the average of the detailed occupational group	The occupational group refers to a three-digit ISCO.
Institutional context	Unpaid overtime	Person was engaged in unpaid overtime during the reference week	No distinction has been made over the hours of the overtime as any amount of hours should be subject to payment.

(*Continued*)

Dimension	Indicators	Construction	Notes
	Public Employment Services (PES) involvement	PES has not been involved in finding the current job (if the individual has started the job 12 months or less)	The involvement could take place at any time of the job search. The share is presented over the total number of employees.
Income	Low income from main job	Low income is measured as being at least one deviation lower from the average of the detailed occupational group (ISCO 3 digit)	The income in the LFS is presented in deciles.
Insecurity	Fears job loss	"Person is looking for another job because of risk or certainty of loss or termination of present job"	
Job context/ conditions	Higher education mismatch	The person has higher education but does not work as a manager, professional or associate professional.	Managers, professionals or associate professionals correspond to ISCO codes 100, 200 and 300.
	Working conditions dissatisfaction	"Person is looking for another job because of wish to have better working conditions, e.g., pay, working or travel time, quality of work"	

Our analysis covers all 28 EU Member States plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. Three points in time have been chosen using the respective cross-sectional data from the EU LFS. In particular, the years 2005, 2010 and 2015 have been chosen so as to capture different points of the economic cycle allowing thus to scrutinise how the incidence of precarious employment has been transformed by the ongoing, for many countries, economic crisis. The yearly EU LFS data have been chosen for the analysis (as opposed to the quarterly data) as these correspond to the best sample available for all variables for a given country and year. In particular, it corresponds either to a single quarter (typically the second) for past years, the average of quarterly data of to a sub-sample distributed along the year (for more details see *ibid*.). The country datasets have all been appended into single yearly files and then the precarious dimensions mentioned above have been constructed. The analysis draws on those individuals that at the time of the survey were within the age band of 25–54 years. This has been a deliberate choice so as not to capture younger or older individuals whose status in the labour market can be considered generally as vulnerable and thus may be more prone to precarious employment, which would inflate the overall estimations. For instance, young workers may be willing to accept jobs that would otherwise indicate precariousness so as to gain working experience and move to a job better suited to their qualities in the future. In a similar vein, older workers may choose such jobs in the view of flexibility or in order to reach the threshold necessary for claiming pension rights. As the exact motives, with the exception of the non-standard employment types, of taking up a particular job are not explicitly measured a choice has been made to only capture the core-workforce, that aged 25–54, that one would expect its main motive for accepting employment would be the best match to their qualities. Moreover, the analysis is

restricted to those in paid employment. The rationale behind this choice is twofold. On the one hand, the EU LFS variables utilised are mainly, though not exclusively, asked for those engaged in paid employment. On the other hand, however it would be difficult to apply such uniform measures to self-employed or family workers as one can argue that such workers opt for maximum flexibility in terms of the working conditions under which they would agree to work. Thus, this segment of the workforce is left out from the analysis. However, as mentioned elsewhere in the book, the final adopted constructs or the sample population would still be subject to measurement errors.

GROUPING OF COUNTRIES

The analysis focuses on EU-28 in order to maximise the coverage and offer comparable results across all EU countries. Nevertheless, the inclusion of all EU countries challenges the depth of the analysis, and this is acknowledged as a limitation of this book. In order to facilitate commenting on the empirical results, the EU-28 countries have been grouped according to their geographical location, namely, Continental (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg), Anglo-Saxon (the UK and Ireland), Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus), Nordic (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Iceland) and Post-Socialist (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia). Results for Norway and Switzerland are presented separately given that they do not belong to the European Union.

Even though each country has its distinctive characteristics, while intra-country differences also exist, there are certain

commonalities across neighbouring countries as far as the economy, the state of the labour market and the institutional context is concerned. For instance, neighbouring countries share elements of their welfare state model, and in fact a number of works distinguish four distinctive models within the EU15 (see, e.g. Esping-Andersen (1990); European Commission (2007); Sapir (2006)), which reflect the above geographical groups. To elaborate, Continental countries rely on insurance-based benefits and old-age pensions, while the influence of unions remains relatively strong. Nordic countries feature the highest level of social protection and universal welfare provision. Mediterranean countries concentrate their spending on old-age pensions, while collective bargaining maintains a highly compressed wage structure. Anglo-Saxon countries are characterised by active measures aiming to improve the employability of the unemployed; weak trade unions and large wage disparities. It is worth noting that in all the above works on the basis of commonalities of labour market institutions the Netherlands is classified as a Nordic country and thus our study has adopted the same approach. As for the post-socialist countries, Beblavy (2008) has developed the following typology: Latvia is classified as "*invisible*" as it provides a combination of a very small welfare state with smaller redistributive efforts than its peers; Estonia and Lithuania are classified as "liberal light" group as their liberal welfare state is much smaller than those of European states classified in the liberal model; the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are classified as "conservative light" due to the combination of its features resembling a conservative model, but with a much smaller size. Slovenia is being classified in a group of its own as "nearly conservative" due to the size and shape of its welfare state putting it closer to some EU-15 countries (e.g. Germany, Austria) than to the other EU-10 countries. Finally, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia are

grouped together, comprising an "uncertain middle" between liberal and conservative. However, for the purposes of our analysis, even though the classification of Beblavy (2008) provides a platform for understanding the results, we have chosen to present all post-socialist countries in a single framework.

However, such commonalties translate into relatively homogeneous labour market institutions and thus aid rationalising such grouping in order to facilitate commenting on and understanding the results of the empirical work. This practice is customary in the analysis of the European labour market (see, e.g. European Commission (2014)). As far as precarious employment is concerned, Duell (2004) has formulated the hypothesis that countries' and regions' production models, flexibility strategies and social security systems are to a large extent determining the incidence of precarious employment. Moreover, ETUC (2007) claims that excessive flexibility, which is a central characteristic of a welfare state model, leads to precariousness. Further to that, there is a growing body of literature investigating the effects of labour markets and welfare state institutions on the occurrence of non-standard employment (Kahn, 2011). Thus, for the purposes of our analysis, country group dummies are constructed in order to capture such effects.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This section presents the analysis conducted using the data from the European Labour Force Survey and discusses the results. As elaborated in previous sections, the empirical work draws on employees (self-employed not included), aged 25–54 years, only. This is to capture the extent precariousness is affecting the so-called core workforce. Three points in time are

examined, namely 2005, 2010 and 2015. The analysis covers all EU member states plus Iceland and Norway. The purpose of the analysis is to identify trends and patterns across countries; however, detailed analysis at a country level remains beyond the capacity of this work. Overall, data on approximately four million employees are scrutinised.

Table 2.1 presents the sample description, in terms of the main demographic characteristics, for the three years of the analysis. A few first observations can be made about the structure of employment as well as its evolution over time. First of all, it is evident that over the period 2005–2015 a balanced gender composition of employment has been achieved. In particular, in 2015 male and female workers have an equal share of 50% in employment based on our sample. The second observation to be made is that Europe's workforce (in terms of people employed) is ageing while the share of younger workers is shrieking. To elaborate, workers aged 26–35 years accounted for 31% of total employment in 2005, while the respective share in 2015 dropped to 28%. At the same time, workers' mobility has been increasing with the share of non-nationals having experienced a notable rise (7% in 2015 compared to 5% in 2005). Finally, with regards to the level of education, the share of individuals having obtained a university degree has experienced a considerable increase (from 27% in 2005 to 35% in 2015). This fact is, on the one hand, a signal of the transformation of work that is becoming more knowledge intensive. On the other hand, it can be explained as a supply side phenomenon as the share of highly educated workforce that is available for work has also been increasing.

Table 2.2 shows the percentages of precarious employment by type, using the total sample for the three selected years. Staring with precariousness due to the type of contract (i.e. involuntary part-time and involuntary temporary), the first observation to be made is that it has intensified over the years.

Table 2.1. Sample Description, Total EU, 2005, 2010 and 2015.

	2005	2010	2015
Gender			
Men	0.52	0.50	0.50
Women	0.48	0.50	0.50
Age			
26–30	0.15	0.14	0.13
31–35	0.16	0.16	0.15
36–40	0.18	0.17	0.17
41–45	0.18	0.18	0.18
46–50	0.17	0.18	0.19
51–55	0.15	0.17	0.18
Education			
High	0.27	0.30	0.35
Medium	0.22	0.18	0.15
Low	0.51	0.51	0.49
Nationality			
National	0.95	0.94	0.92
Non-national	0.05	0.06	0.07
No of observations	15,56,985	12,04,805	11,86,027

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to employed individuals aged 25–55 years only.

Specifically, both types of contract precariousness have experienced an increase, with their shares in total employment almost being doubled over the period 2005–2015, reaching 12.5% of the total employed workforce in 2015 (while around 7% in 2005). However, the most common type of precariousness is that occurring due to work over unsociable

Table 2.2. Precarious Employment by Type, Total EU, 2005, 2010 and 2015.

%	2005	2010	2015
Contract			
Involuntary part-time	3.0	4.0	5.2
Involuntary temporary	4.3	7.3	7.2
Unsociable hours			
Evening/night work	11.9	15.1	14.7
Saturday/Sunday work	15.8	20.8	19.5
Long usual hours of work[a]	9.8	9.0	9.0
Institutional context			
Unpaid overtime	n/a	3.7	3.4
Public Employment Services involvement	n/a	9.3	10.2
Income	n/a	11.9	9.8
Insecurity	0.6	0.6	0.6
Job context/conditions			
Higher education mismatch	4.9	5.5	5.5
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.3	1.3	1.3

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 years only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

hours. Especially, weekend and evening/night work has increased considerably during the last decade, while in 2015 around 35% of work was related to activities in the course of such unsociable hours (while 25% in 2005). Turning to the institutional context, the share of new employees (employed 12 months or less) for which the public employment services had no involvement at any stage of the job search has been

about 10% of all employees. PES involvement in finding a job has diminished over the years as the respective share in 2010 was around 9%. At the same time, around 3.5% of total employment involved overtime without pay; about 10% received considerable lower pay for the standards of the occupation, while about 9% was working longer hours than usual. The main observation to be made is that even though some elements of precariousness have remained stable over time, the overall situation seems to have intensified over the recent years, clearly having been affected by the recent economic crisis.

Table 2.3 breaks down the types of precariousness by different age groups. In particular, the intensity of precariousness across the different types has been examined for three group 26–35, 36–45 and 46–55. Looking at Table 2.3, the overarching observation to be made is that younger workers (aged 26–35 years) are much more affected by precariousness compared to their older counterparts. Specifically, younger workers have higher shares of involuntary part-time and temporary work (5.7% and 10.8%, respectively, in 2015 compared to 5.2% and 5.1% for the age group 46–55 years), have a more often presence in work over unsociable hours (46% in 2015 compared to 42% for the group 46–55 years), are much less benefited by PES involvement (16.6% compared to 6.6%), have an almost double rate of job insecurity (0.8% compared to 0.4%), experience a much higher rate of education mismatch (10% compared to 7%) while also being much more dissatisfied with their working conditions (2.3% compared to 1.6%). With regards to the evolution over time, precarious employment has intensified for younger workers mostly in terms of contract type and unsociable hours. On balance, in terms of long hours, the rate has decreased. Nevertheless, it is difficult to make any safe conclusions as the usual hours may have actually been extended compared to the

Table 2.3. Precarious Employment by Type, Total EU, by Age Group, 2005–2015.

	26–35		36–45		46–55	
%	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015
Contract						
Involuntary part-time	3.3	5.7	2.9	4.7	2.8	5.2
Involuntary temporary	6.2	10.8	4.0	6.7	2.9	5.1
Unsociable hours						
Evening/night work	12.5	16.2	12.1	14.2	11.1	14.1
Saturday/Sunday work	16.7	21.0	16.0	18.9	14.9	18.8
Long usual hours of work[a]	10.3	8.8	10.1	9.2	9.0	8.9
Institutional context						
Unpaid overtime	n/a	3.2	n/a	3.5	n/a	3.5
Public Employment Services involvement	n/a	16.6	n/a	9.2	n/a	6.6
Income	n/a	12.5	n/a	9.1	n/a	8.5
Insecurity	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4
Job context/conditions						
Higher education mismatch	7.1	10.1	4.6	6.9	3.2	6.9
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.9	2.3	1.3	1.6	0.8	1.6

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 years only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

past. However, older workers (aged 46–55 years) are more affected in terms of education mismatch. This may serve to suggest that older workers have less opportunities to make use of their level of education or are forced to accept some jobs due to financial constraints. At the same time, older workers have

experienced a higher increase in precariousness due to poor working conditions, leading them to look for another job.

Table 2.4 depicts how the various types of precariousness have evolved over time across gender. Starting with the contract type, female workers have higher rates of precariousness for both types of involuntary non-standard work, while being

Table 2.4. Precarious Employment by Type, Total EU, by Gender, 2005–2015.

	Men		Women	
%	2005	2015	2005	2015
Contract				
Involuntary part-time	1.2	2.8	5.0	7.6
Involuntary temporary	3.8	6.7	4.9	7.7
Unsociable hours				
Evening/night work	13.4	16.5	10.2	13.0
Saturday/Sunday work	15.7	19.3	16.0	19.6
Long usual hours of work[a]	11.9	10.6	6.5	6.8
Institutional context				
Unpaid overtime	n/a	3.8	n/a	3.1
Public Employment Services involvement	n/a	10.2	n/a	10.3
Income	n/a	7.6	n/a	12.0
Insecurity	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6
Job context/conditions				
Higher education mismatch	4.4	5.7	5.4	8.2
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.7

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 years only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

particularly higher in those of part-time work (7.6% compared to 2.8% for males in 2015). So, on the one hand, part-time work offers flexibility for females as they often have to combine work and other responsibilities; however, on the other hand, they seem less able than males to find full-time employment. A sign of gender wage gap is observed when looking at the income dimension. Specifically, in 2015, 12% of female employment was receiving a lower wage than the occupation's average compared to 7.6% for male workers. At the same time, female workers were also experiencing a lower match of their education in their labour market, with 8.2% of women with a high level of education being employed in occupations that traditionally do not require a higher degree, while the respective percentage for men was 5.7%. Higher education mismatch for females has not only been considerably higher than males, but has also experienced a sharper increase over the decade (2005–2015). On balance, both genders have experienced an approximately equal increase in their shares in involuntary non-standard employment as well as work during unsociable hours. Nevertheless, the results suggest that females have been having greater difficulties in finding a job matching their skills over the years of the economic crisis. Notably, females also have a higher rate of job insecurity and dissatisfaction in terms of working conditions. On balance, PES involvement is affecting both genders to the same extent, as about 10% of both sexes were not benefited at any stage of the job search from the help of a public employment service. With regards to working patterns in terms of time, male workers have an overall higher share of employment during unsociable hours (46% of total employment in 2015) compared to females (39%). To elaborate, weekend work is the most common type of work during unsociable hours for both genders affecting about one in five workers.

Table 2.5 breaks down the rates of precarious employment by the level of education while distinguishing the three aggregate ISCED levels; namely low, medium and high. The first observation to be made is that individuals with a low level of education not only have the highest share of involuntary

Table 2.5. Precarious Employment by Type, Total EU, by Level of Education, 2005–2015.

	High		Medium		Low	
%	2005	2015	2005	2015	2005	2015
Contract						
Involuntary part-time	2.1	3.1	2.7	5.0	4.7	10.5
Involuntary temporary	3.6	5.8	3.9	6.5	6.1	13.2
Unsociable hours						
Evening/night work	8.9	10.8	13.7	17.1	11.6	16.0
Saturday/Sunday work	9.6	13.5	18.0	22.4	18.4	23.8
Long usual hours of work[a]	9.8	9.9	9.5	8.2	10.4	9.4
Institutional context						
Unpaid overtime	n/a	6.0	n/a	2.1	n/a	1.5
Public Employment Services involvement	n/a	10.0	n/a	9.6	n/a	12.8
Income	n/a	8.0	n/a	10.5	n/a	12.1
Insecurity	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.7
Job context/conditions						
Higher education mismatch	18.2	19.8	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.3	2.1	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.7

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 years only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

non-standard employment but have also experienced the most dramatic increases during the last decade. In particular, while the share of involuntary part-time and involuntary temporary for the low educated was 4.7% and 6.1% in 2015, they reached 10.5% and 13.2%, respectively, in 2015. The rates for the medium and highly educated also increased during the same period, however at a much lower pace. For instance, the rates of the highly educated in 2015 were 3.1% (involuntary part-time) and 5.7% (involuntary temporary). The impact of the economic crisis on the intensity of work during unsociable hours has been more or less equal for all levels of education. Nevertheless, the rates of evening/night and work during the weekends are much higher for the low educated than any other level of education. At the same time, the low educated have a higher rate of income precarity (i.e. receive a much lower wage than the average in their occupation) while PES is less involved in their job search (12.8%) compared to other levels of education (10% and 9.5% for high and medium educated, respectively, in 2015).

Table 2.6 breaks down the total EU sample by nationality. In particular, it distinguishes whether the individual is employed at his/her own country or whether he/she is a non-national. As can be seen in Table 2.6, non-nationals have a much higher share of involuntary part-time (10.5%) and temporary employment (9.6%) compared to their national counterparts (4.7% and 7%). However, while looking at the evolution over time, it is observed that it is mainly involuntary part-time employment that has been intensified for non-nationals over the last decade. On the contrary, it is for nationals that the share of involuntary temporary has increased. One can infer than non-nationals are more interested in the availability of employment at a full-time basis while nationals may be more focused on finding employment of a permanent nature. Moreover, non-nationals have

Table 2.6. Precarious Employment by Type, Total EU, by Nationality, 2005–2015.

	Own Country		Non-national	
%	2005	2015	2005	2015
Contract				
Involuntary part-time	2.8	4.7	5.4	10.5
Involuntary temporary	4.2	7.0	7.2	9.6
Unsociable hours				
Evening/night work	11.7	14.4	16.3	19.0
Saturday/Sunday work	15.5	18.6	22.8	29.8
Long usual hours of work[a]	9.7	8.8	11.6	10.9
Institutional context				
Unpaid overtime	n/a	3.5	n/a	3.0
Public Employment Services involvement	n/a	9.8	n/a	16.0
Income	n/a	9.6	n/a	11.9
Insecurity	0.6	0.5	1.0	0.9
Job context/conditions				
Higher education mismatch	4.7	6.6	7.4	10.6
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.3	1.6	2.0	2.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 years only.
[a]It only captures full-time employees.

generally much higher rates of employment occurring during unsociable hours. For instance, about 19% of employment for non-nationals, in 2015, occurred during evening/night work and about 30% during weekends while the perspective percentages for nationals were approximately 15% and 19%,

respectively. However, no notable difference is being observed on the evolution of the shares over time. Similarly, both nationals and non-nationals have experienced an equal increase in higher education mismatch; however, the shares of non-nationals are overall higher (10.6% compared to 6.6% in 2015). Along the same lines, non-nationals are more affected by income precarity (12% compared to 9.5% in 2015) while having a higher rate of working condition dissatisfaction (2% compared to 1.6%). Finally, PES involvement at some stage of the job search has been much less apparent for non-nationals (16%) compared to their national counterparts (10%).

Table 2.7 breaks down the EU sample into the different country groups. The first observation to be made is that Mediterranean countries, in terms of intensification of precarious employment, have been affected more by the recent economic crisis than any other group. In particular, Mediterranean countries, over the period 2010–2015, have experienced dramatic increases in their shares of weekend work (50%), longer usual hours (130%) and unpaid overtime (170%). As a result, their share of working conditions dissatisfaction has more than tripled over the same period. Mediterranean countries also have a considerably higher rate of higher education mismatch (15%) compared to any other country group (e.g. 6.7% in continental countries), which hints towards structural problems of the economies of these countries as well as lack of demand for higher levels of education.

On the other hand, continental and post-socialist countries have experienced decreases in their share of most groups of precarious work. Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries have both experienced an increase in their share of involuntary non-standard employment as well as of precariousness related to job conditions. Involuntary non-standard employment as well as income precarity is highest, however, in Anglo-Saxon

Table 2.7. Precarious Employment by Type and Country Group, 2010–2015.

	Continental		Mediter-ranean		Anglo-Saxon		Nordic		Post Socialist	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract										
Involuntary part-time	4.5	5.1	6.1	6.7	5.1	10.0	2.7	4.8	3.2	1.6
Involuntary temporary	5.0	4.3	2.3	3.3	8.1	12.8	2.8	6.5	7.3	8.3
Unsociable hours										
Evening/night work	16.1	14.1	12.8	12.6	17.9	17.3	17.1	16.9	14.0	12.8
Saturday/Sunday work	24.6	18.5	17.3	26.0	28.1	27.1	17.1	15.8	16.1	14.4
Long usual hours of work[a]	11.9	10.6	5.6	12.9	10.6	10.6	6.8	5.0	6.6	7.7
Institutional context										
Unpaid overtime	5.8	3.8	2.6	7.2	3.3	2.8	4.8	6.3	3.2	0.7

Public Employment Services involvement	7.6	9.0	8.1	9.0	8.6	11.3	9.8	13.3	10.6	9.3
Income	10.2	9.1	5.1	6.8	16.4	13.5	8.3	4.6	12.7	11.0
Insecurity	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.2	0.7	0.2
Job context/conditions										
Higher education mismatch	6.3	6.7	14.6	14.9	5.4	7.4	3.9	6.3	3.9	5.3
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.4	1.5	0.4	1.6	0.7	1.8	2.3	2.6	1.4	1.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

countries as well as in Post Socialist ones. However, the patterns of involuntary part-time and temporary work are not the same across the different country groups. For example, in Mediterranean countries the rates of involuntary part-time (6.7%) work are higher than temporary (3.3%) ones. This could be due to features of economy as in Mediterranean countries, which rely on services such as agricultural activities and tourism, where temporary work may actually be desirable as a means of economic activity. On the other hand, in Anglo-Saxon and Post Socialist countries, it is the involuntary temporary work that has higher shares (12.8% and 8.3%, respectively, compared to 10% and 1.6% for involuntary part-time work). As for Anglo-Saxon countries, work during unsociable hours is very common, with more than 40% of employment occurring during weekends or evenings. Finally, Nordic countries experience the higher rate of working condition dissatisfaction (expressed by looking for another job); however, this finding should be treated with care as it may signal that in such countries it is easier to find another job to the workers' liking as compared to, e.g., Mediterranean countries which have a lower rate (1.6%), but the tightness of the labour market may not "allow" them to look for another job due to working condition dissatisfaction.

Figs 2.1–2.11 show the rates of the different types of precarious employment across European countries. Starting with involuntary part-time (Figure 2.1) work, the highest shares are observed for three Mediterranean countries: Italy (13%), Spain (11%) and Greece (8%). This situation is indicative of the impact the economic crisis had on the labour markets of these countries. On the one hand, there has been a lack of demand for full-time jobs, while on the other hand, the increase of part-time jobs has been, in some instances, seen as a means of fighting unemployment and increasing flexibility. Nevertheless, from a worker's perspective it has increased the

Fig. 2.1. Involuntary Part-time Across EU, 2015 (%).



levels of precariousness. France and Ireland are another two countries with a high rate (8%) of involuntary part-time employment. Regarding France, the rate has intensified less dramatically during the crisis (was 5.7% in 2010) while its high rate can be explained partly due to the relative less widespread use of flexible working time arrangements, the relatively low protection of living standards for part-time workers (e.g. low employment rate of spouses) and the lower acceptance of constraints arising, e.g., from lack of child-care facilities or the difficulty of achieving a better work-life balance in a full-time position (Costes, Rambert, & Saillard, 2015). In other words, there may be institutional or cultural reasons making a part-time job less acceptable. As for Ireland, it is one of the countries whose employment rate has dropped dramatically during the economic crisis, making it, thus, one of the most difficult labour markets to find a job in (Llewellyn Consulting, 2016), which can in turn explain the involuntary element of the part-time jobs. For the rest of the countries, the rates have remained at reasonable low levels and around 4% on average.

With regards to involuntary temporary employment (from Fig. 2.2), there are four countries with particularly high shares (over 15%). The highest is for Spain, which in 2015 was approximately 21%. The incidence of this type of precarious employment for Spain is particularly high for a number of reasons. First of all, Spain is a country where the share of temporary employment has traditionally been very high even before the crisis, accounting for even more than 30% of total employment (OECD, 2016). However, even though there have been initiatives during the crisis to prompt employers to offer open-ended contracts, most of the new hires are for temporary contracts (OECD, 2016). The second highest is that of Cyprus (17.5%), where before the crisis, contrary to Spain, the overall rate of temporary employment remained at

Fig. 2.2. Involuntary Temporary Across EU, 2015 (%).



very low levels. However, the recession had a dramatic impact on the quality of the jobs in the labour market (Cyprus Employment Institute, 2016). An equally high rate of involuntary temporary employment is for Poland, a country with traditionally high rates of temporary employment. In particular, roughly 25% of all wage employment for that country is temporary. However, almost half of the temporary contracts refer to work through civil contracts that are not fully regulated by the labour code while they offer very limited benefits and pension rights. As a result, a temporary contract is not really seen as a preferable option in Poland, thus the very high rate of involuntary temporary employment (The World Bank, 2014). Finally, Portugal is the other Iberian country with a very high share (17.3%). As in the case of Spain, Portugal had traditionally experienced very high rates of temporary employment partly due to heavy reliance on tourism services that have a strong temporary character. However, during the crisis and specifically following the attempts to promote flexible working patterns even further, this phenomenon has intensified, especially for young workers who being in temporary jobs may have difficulties in complying with the need for a continuous record of social requirements that would grant them access to insurance benefits (Perista, Nunes, & Carrilho, 2013).

Fig. 2.3 presents both the rates of night work and shift work across EU countries. Starting with night work, one can observe that it is relatively a rare form of work across EU countries, which, however, has intensified over the years of the economic crisis. In general, only a share of as low as 10% of establishments requires their employees to work during the night (Kummerling & Lehndorff, 2007). In fact, almost all EU countries have a share of night work that is below 10%. A notable exception is that of Slovakia, where about 18% of the total workforce is regularly involved in night work. This can

Fig. 2.3. Night/Shift Work in EU, 2015 (%).



be attributed, on the one hand, to the structure of the economy which heavily relies in activities such as automotive, chemicals, oil refineries, steel mills etc. that operate uninterruptedly requiring, thus, large numbers of workforce. The second reason is the relatively low surcharges for night work that do not refrain the employers from using workforce for night work (The Slovak Spectator, 2017). Italy and Malta also have a high share of night work (10% approximately) which can be attributed to the large tourism and hotels and restaurants sector that requires night work. Turning to shift work, this has been a traditional method of organising time allowing companies to extend their operating times. Looking at Fig. 2.3 a general observation to be made is that shift work is considerably higher for new EU countries, such as Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, that have more than 25% of the working population working on shifts regularly. In order to understand this pattern, one has to consider the structure of the economies (heavy reliance on manufacturing) of such countries as well as the relatively low cost of labour that make them attractive for large companies to establish their business there. However, there are cases where the impact of the economic crisis has been detrimental on the intensification of shift work. In particular, Greece has seen its shares increasing dramatically from around 20% in 2005 to 28% approximately in 2015. This has been the outcome of a slack labour market with very low availability of jobs, mostly in catering, bars and restaurant sectors that typically require shift work.

Fig. 2.4 presents the rates of work during the weekend, which overall is a common practice across European countries. In particular, working on Saturday is the most popular type of weekend work as about 19% of workers in Europe are used to such practice. Greece, Italy and Cyprus are the countries where Saturday work is most common with rates

Fig. 2.4. Saturday/Sunday Work Across EU, 2015 (%).



over 30% (32%, 31.5% and 31%, respectively). Such high rates can be explained by the features of the economy in these countries, which heavily rely on services such as tourism, agriculture, retail, bars and restaurants as well as a high rate of self-employed activities, so Saturday work is a common practice. Nevertheless, the economic crisis had a hand in the intensification of this phenomenon. In particular, while in Italy working on a Saturday was already a very common practice before the crisis (e.g. 33% in 2005); in Greece and Cyprus the rates, even though relatively high, were significantly lower (24% and 22%, respectively[2]). Sunday work is a far less common practice in Europe. Interestingly, the highest are the rates in a different set of countries, while it is less common in the Mediterranean region. In particular, countries with a rate around 15% include Switzerland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the UK. Since there is no specific EU regulation regarding Sunday work, there is a variety of reasons behind country differences that one needs to consider, including economic, social, historical and cultural reasons. For example, while in some countries (e.g. Germany) Sunday is considered a day of rest, in others (e.g. Ireland, Malta, Slovakia) it is considered acceptable and not interfering with the lifestyle. At the same time, in countries such as Greece and Belgium the issue of shops opening on Sundays remains a point of consultation between social partners (Messenger, 2011). Nevertheless, the overall trend in Europe is towards extending work to Sundays (Boulin, 2013), and recent legislative developments have tried to reinforce this trend (Cabrita, 2016).

Figs 2.5 and 2.6 present indicators linked to working hours. Here it is important to note that even though EU labour law covers working time, these laws often operate

[2] Authors' estimations are not presented in the tables.

Fig. 2.5. Long Usual Hours of Work (%).



Fig. 2.6. Unpaid Overtime Across EU, 2015 (%).



differently in different member states. Therefore, it is difficult to make safe conclusions while looking into country differences. Nevertheless, some observations can be made on the pressures workers face across countries from these indicators. Fig. 2.5 shows the share of full-time workers that work longer hours compared to the standard hours of work of their occupational group. In other words, this measure identifies the segment of workers who typically work longer than their peers. Greece, Portugal and Cyprus are amongst the countries that stand out with a share of approximately 16%. The relatively high share could be linked to the thinness of these countries' labour market, as an outcome of the economic crisis that may "force" that segment into working longer hours. However, this finding becomes even more striking once one realises that Greece and Portugal are already the EU countries with the longest working week (Luxton, 2016). Nevertheless, the highest share across EU member states belongs to the UK (around 25%), which, however, has on average a shorter working week than the EU average. On the opposite spectrum, the Netherlands has the lowest share (1%) while at the same time it also has the shortest working week (Stepenson, 2012). Fig. 2.5 shows the rates of unpaid overtime. In general, overtime is meant to offer flexibility to the companies while facing increased workload while giving the opportunity to employees to increase their income. However, it is a signal of precariousness which occurs with no pay. In general, the EU average was about 3.5%; nevertheless there were a few cases standing out. In particular, the rate has been more than 15% in two member states, namely the Netherlands (22.3%) and the UK (16.3%). Both countries operate a flexible labour market where non-standard forms of work are a very common practice. Nevertheless, this allows for misuse of practices, often at the expense of the employees. In particular, in the case of the Netherlands, underpayment of temporary workers is a

practice often capturing the attention of the Dutch labour inspectorate (Galli da Bino). As for the UK, unpaid overtime has constantly been an issue capturing the attention of the Trade Unions Congress, which has been campaigning that this phenomenon is not only bad for workers' health but also for the whole economy as it is cutting down on job creation (Carley, 2012).

Fig. 2.7 shows the share of newly (12 months or less) employed people for whom the Public Employment Service (PES) has actually had some involvement in finding the current job as some time of the job search. This serves to be a more accurate measure[3] of how the institutional framework has helped in combatting joblessness. As can be seen from Fig. 2.7 in countries where the economic crisis has been severe, such as Cyprus (2.8%), Spain (3.7%), Italy (2.4%), Greece (6.7%), the PES have offered very little help compared to the EU average.

Fig. 2.8 shows the share of employees whose income is significantly (more than one standard deviation) lower that their occupation's average. Looking at country differences, it is observed that it is employees in new member states that are mostly affected by this type of precariousness. In particular, while the EU average is about 10%, countries such as Latvia, Romania and Estonia have rates close to 20%. Italy, Greece and Cyprus also have rates above the EU average and close to 15%. A general observation to be made is that countries where union density and bargaining coverage are relatively lower, income inequalities tend to be higher (European Parliament, 2015). Job insecurity is presented in Fig. 2.9. In particular, this figure shows the share of workers who are

[3] In relation to the indicator used in other parts of this chapter which shows the share of those for which PES were not involved at any time of the job search and was expressed over the total number of employed people.

Fig. 2.7. PES Involvement Across EU, 2015 (%).



Fig. 2.8. Low Income Across EU, 2015 (%).



Fig. 2.9. Insecurity Across EU, 2015 (%).



looking for another job because they fear termination of their current one. Among others, Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Norway) have higher than the EU average rates. Nevertheless, in such countries the flexicurity arrangements and in particular the high levels of employment security generally alleviate the detrimental effects that job security can have on health and well-being (Vulkan, Saloniemi, Svalund, & Vaisanen, 2015). On the other hand, new member states where the institutional arrangements are less favourable for workers, such as Slovenia and Croatia, the rates are also significantly high. The rate is also high for Spain, a member state with particularly high levels of unemployment.

Fig. 2.10 shows the rates of higher education mismatch, namely the share of highly educated workers who are working in relatively low-skilled jobs. Spain, Cyprus and Greece are again amongst the countries with the highest rates. Even though these are countries facing problems of overeducation (Livanos, 2010), the situation has been intensified through the years of the economic crisis. For instance, while in 2010 the rate in Greece was 7%, it increased dramatically to 11% in 2015. This has also been the case for Spain (from 15% to 18%) and Cyprus (from 13% to 16%). This comes as no surprise as the thinness of the labour market over the period of the crisis has significantly affected the matching process. Ireland is another country with traditionally high rates of overeducation (McGuinness, O'Shaughnessy, & Pouliakas, 2017) that has also been affected during the crisis (from 14.5% to 15%). Finally, Fig. 2.11 shows the rates of working condition dissatisfaction expressed as the share of workers who are looking for another job because they are not satisfied with the conditions in their current employment. Working conditions is an area that is covered by European Union Law.[4]

[4] http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706.

Fig. 2.10. Higher Education Mismatch Across EU, 2015 (%).



Fig. 2.11. Working Conditions Dissatisfaction Across EU, 2015 (%).



In general, the share as expressed in the measurement used remains at low levels. For instance, the shares are highest for Croatia (5.7%), Norway (5.5%) and Portugal (4%). However, once the reason for looking for another job is analysed, it is made clear that working conditions is, in most countries, the primary reason for looking for another job (42% at EU level), this being highest for Slovakia (75%), Portugal (66%), Spain (67%), Poland (72%), Latvia (67%) and Croatia (70%).[5]

Table 2.8 shows the score of precariousness across groups of workers. In other words, it provides the average sum across all types of precarious employment constructing, thus, a measurement of the intensity of the phenomenon. For instance, women across all member states in 2015 were on average in 1.5 precarious categories. Overall, we observe that younger workers, low educated and non-nationals experience the highest scores, with the latter found to be, on average, in two groups of precarious employment simultaneously. The scores for low educated and younger workers were 1.7 and 1.9, respectively. On balance, the score is equal across genders. In terms of change over time, it is shown that young workers and the highly educated are those who have experienced the highest pressures (as expressed by a higher increase in the score of precariousness).

Table 2.9 shows the scores of precariousness across the countries. Overall, the scores vary from 0.8 to 2, confirming the notion that all jobs, in one way or another, involve an element of precariousness. The highest scores are observed for Greece, Spain, Cyprus, the Netherlands and Slovakia, in which countries the average is close to 2. The same groups of countries have, more or less, also experienced the highest increases over time. The UK and the Netherlands are among

[5] These figures are not reported in the tables or graphs.

Table 2.8. Precarious Score by Gender, Age, Education and Nationality, Total EU, 2010 and 2015.

	2010	2015
Gender		
Men	1.4	1.5
Women	1.5	1.5
Age		
26–30	1.7	1.9
31–35	1.5	1.6
36–40	1.4	1.4
41–45	1.4	1.4
46–50	1.4	1.3
51–55	1.3	1.3
Education		
High	1.2	1.4
Medium	1.5	1.5
Low	1.8	1.7
Nationality		
National	1.4	1.4
Non-national	2.0	2.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to employed individuals aged 25–55 only.

the countries with the highest scores. These countries are characterised by high levels of labour market flexibility; nevertheless, as this analysis, shows this flexibility is compensated with high intensity of work precariousness.

Table 2.9. Precarious Score Across EU Countries, 2010 and 2015.

	2010	2015
Continental		
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
Mediterranean		
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
Anglo-Saxon		
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
Nordic		
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
Post Socialist		
0	0.0	0.0
Lithuania	0.9	1.0
0	0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0

Table 2.9. (*Continued*)

	2010	2015
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0
0	0.0	0.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to employed individuals aged 25–55 years only.

Figs 2.12–2.15 plot the score of precariousness against other indicators in the form of bubble charts. Fig. 2.12 shows how the precarious score relates to the actual numbers of precarious jobs across countries. As it can be made clear from the graph, there are four countries which not only have a score but also a very large number of precarious jobs. These countries are Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK, followed by France with a large number of precarious jobs but a lower score. On the other hand, lower scores are typically accompanied with smaller numbers of precarious jobs. Of course the number of precarious jobs is related to the size of the country, nevertheless large countries like Poland or Romania have relatively smaller number of jobs being affected.

Fig. 2.13 relates the score with the level of unemployment. A strong relationship between the two measures can be

Fig. 2.12. Precarious Score and Size Across EU Countries in 2015.



Fig. 2.13. Precarious Score and Level of Unemployment Across EU Countries in 2015.



Fig. 2.14. Precarious Score and Employment Strictness Across EU Countries in 2015.



observed, with countries with high level of unemployment, like Greece, Spain, or Cyprus, also having a very high precarious score. On the other hand, countries like Norway or Sweden where the level of unemployment remains at low levels and below 10%, the precarious score is also very low. This finding does not come as a surprise as the low availability of jobs (as expressed by high rates of unemployment) creates pressures in the labour market, "forcing" individuals to accept jobs that have elements of precariousness.

Employment strictness is another factor that seems to be related with high scores of precariousness. For instance, Greece, Spain and Italy are countries with high rates of strictness that also exhibit high precarious scores. In fact, one can argue that in countries where hiring and firing is rather complex and expensive, employers decide to resource work arrangements that are away from the open-ended, full-time, nine-to-five weekdays work so as to secure a more 'expendable' workforce.

Finally, Fig. 2.15 shows the relation to the GDP growth over the decade 2005–2015. As with the case of unemployment, a counter-cyclical pattern is observed. In particular, the countries that have experienced negative or marginally positive growth, like Greece, Italy, Spain or Cyprus, also suffer from the highest scores of precariousness.

Tables 2.10–2.40 show results at the country level for the various types of indicators of precariousness, broken down by key demographic groups. The results are presented for 2010 and 2015 separately. The present chapter has presented an overview of trends of precariousness across Europe; however, in order to identify specific country trends, one has to delve into country date and combine it with local knowledge and qualitative aspects in order to be in a position to make safe conclusions. In-depth country analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Fig. 2.15. Precarious Score and GDP 2005–2015 Change Across EU Countries.



Table 2.10. Precarious Employment in Austria 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	2.6	3.2	2.3	3.0	2.4	2.6	3.2	3.7	1.1	1.4	4.3	5.0	2.4	2.7	5.0	6.1
Involuntary temporary	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.7	1.7	1.3
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	12.6	11.9	12.3	12.3	12.4	11.4	13.1	12.0	15.6	14.5	9.6	9.3	12.1	11.2	17.6	16.5
Saturday/Sunday work	27.0	25.5	25.8	25.1	26.7	24.7	28.3	26.5	25.4	23.4	28.7	27.6	26.6	24.8	31.4	30.0
Long usual hours of work[a]	15.4	15.4	13.5	14.0	16.6	15.8	15.6	16.2	18.5	17.7	9.4	11.0	15.5	16.1	13.8	11.4
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	5.0	4.0	4.7	4.1	5.0	3.7	5.2	4.1	5.9	4.4	4.1	3.5	5.1	4.0	4.1	3.5

Public Employment Services involvement	11.1	11.4	17.5	18.2	10.5	10.6	6.9	7.4	10.6	11.0	11.6	11.9	10.3	10.0	18.8	21.1
Income	15.6	0.0	18.0	0.0	15.6	0.0	13.9	0.0	4.9	0.0	26.6	0.0	15.1	0.0	21.0	0.0
Insecurity	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.30	0.15	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.19	0.19	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.25
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	3.8	8.3	4.1	11.1	3.9	8.0	3.4	6.7	4.4	7.7	3.2	8.9	3.6	7.6	5.9	13.0
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.0	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.0	1.2	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.7	2.1

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.11. Precarious Employment in Begium 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	2.9	2.8	3.6	3.6	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.2	1.4	1.7	4.5	3.9	2.6	2.1	5.9	6.9
Involuntary temporary	5.3	6.4	9.0	11.2	4.1	5.5	3.2	3.3	4.1	5.8	6.5	7.0	4.7	5.4	10.9	13.2
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	11.5	9.1	11.7	9.7	11.7	9.2	11.0	8.5	13.7	11.3	9.2	7.0	11.4	8.9	12.0	10.1
Saturday/Sunday work	14.1	17.2	15.3	20.3	14.0	17.0	13.1	14.9	13.4	16.6	14.8	17.8	14.2	17.1	13.0	18.0
Long usual hours of work[a]	7.3	6.8	5.6	5.5	7.8	7.0	8.6	7.9	8.3	7.7	5.5	5.5	7.1	6.7	9.5	8.0

Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	6.1	5.0	5.9	4.8	6.6	5.1	5.7	5.0	7.3	5.9	4.8	4.1	6.0	5.0	6.4	5.0
Public Employment Services involvement	8.3	9.2	14.4	15.9	7.4	7.8	4.0	4.8	8.2	9.4	8.4	8.9	7.5	8.2	16.1	15.2
Income	17.1	16.8	16.0	22.8	17.0	15.2	18.2	13.3	4.8	11.9	29.7	21.7	16.6	16.9	21.8	16.3
Insecurity	0.70	0.76	0.99	1.00	0.71	0.77	0.45	0.55	0.75	0.79	0.66	0.74	0.66	0.70	1.14	1.17
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	10.0	9.2	12.5	9.9	10.5	9.4	7.3	8.4	7.7	7.3	12.3	11.1	9.8	8.8	11.4	11.9
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.7	1.4	2.7	2.2	1.8	1.4	0.8	0.6	1.8	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.6	1.2	2.4	2.3

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.12. Precarious Employment in Bulgaria 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	0.8	1.0	0.6	1.3	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
Involuntary temporary	2.7	3.0	3.5	4.2	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.8	3.0	3.3	2.5	2.7	1.7	3.0	0.0	0.0
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	11.3	12.2	12.1	12.1	11.3	12.4	10.7	12.2	12.5	12.9	10.1	11.5	25.5	12.2	9.1	28.6
Saturday/Sunday work	18.8	17.2	21.0	18.5	19.5	17.4	16.6	16.1	20.9	19.0	16.6	15.3	18.4	17.2	18.2	28.6
Long usual hours of work[a]	17.4	12.6	20.3	12.6	17.9	12.8	14.9	12.5	20.1	13.4	14.7	11.8	23.4	12.7	9.1	0.0
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.0

Public Employment Services involvement	7.4	7.7	10.0	11.6	7.3	6.9	5.8	6.0	7.7	8.6	7.2	6.7	10.7	7.6	9.1	28.6
Income	18.1	14.1	17.6	13.2	18.5	13.8	18.0	14.9	11.1	11.2	25.1	17.0	25.8	14.1	9.1	28.6
Insecurity	0.13	0.22	0.14	0.29	0.13	0.27	0.12	0.11	0.16	0.24	0.09	0.19	1.15	0.22	0.00	0.00
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	6.1	7.6	9.1	12.0	5.5	6.7	4.5	5.7	5.1	5.9	7.1	9.2	9.2	7.6	18.2	0.0
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	2.9	0.2	0.0	0.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.13. Precarious Employment in Switzerland 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	2.7	3.1	2.6	3.5	2.4	2.8	3.1	3.2	1.2	1.5	4.2	4.7	2.0	2.3	3.8	4.6
Involuntary temporary	1.2	1.3	2.0	2.2	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	0.9	0.8	1.8	2.3
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	16.5	15.1	16.8	15.8	16.3	15.1	16.5	14.8	15.5	13.7	17.5	16.6	14.7	13.5	19.5	18.1
Saturday/Sunday work	30.4	29.2	30.6	30.1	29.9	27.7	31.0	30.0	26.2	24.8	34.7	33.6	30.1	28.9	31.0	29.8
Long usual hours of work[a]	0.8	3.7	1.3	3.7	0.8	4.0	0.4	3.5	0.7	3.8	1.1	3.5	0.8	3.6	0.9	3.9
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	6.1	5.1	5.3	4.3	6.8	5.4	5.9	5.4	7.8	6.5	4.5	3.8	6.2	5.2	5.9	5.1

Public Employment Services involvement	11.4	12.6	17.4	20.5	10.7	12.0	7.6	8.3	10.5	11.3	12.4	13.8	10.5	11.8	12.9	14.0
Income	11.1	18.0	10.9	21.5	11.7	19.1	10.7	14.9	2.2	7.0	20.1	28.8	11.7	20.6	10.3	13.4
Insecurity	1.30	1.50	1.82	2.49	1.22	1.46	0.99	0.92	1.36	1.45	1.24	1.55	1.12	1.12	1.61	2.17
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	6.7	7.2	7.2	7.9	6.6	7.0	6.4	6.9	7.8	7.5	5.5	6.9	7.1	7.3	6.0	6.9
Working conditions dissatisfaction	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.7	2.7	3.1	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.8	3.3	2.3	2.7	3.4	3.7

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 years only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.14. Precarious Employment in Cyprus 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	1.7	5.2	2.4	5.7	1.4	4.5	1.2	5.4	1.1	4.5	2.3	5.8	1.8	5.3	1.4	4.7
Involuntary temporary	14.3	17.5	16.3	21.4	15.8	17.3	9.9	13.6	6.1	11.8	21.7	22.5	6.4	9.3	38.1	44.9
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	5.9	11.1	6.0	13.6	5.9	9.4	5.8	10.3	7.2	14.3	4.7	8.3	4.8	10.2	9.2	14.0
Saturday/Sunday work	28.4	31.4	29.4	33.7	29.1	30.5	26.1	29.8	20.3	26.9	35.6	35.2	18.3	21.8	59.1	63.4
Long usual hours of work[a]	12.3	15.9	10.2	15.4	13.3	15.3	13.7	17.2	16.2	19.9	8.6	12.3	10.6	13.2	17.2	24.7
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.6

Public Employment Services involvement	14.3	15.8	20.9	23.4	11.7	12.8	8.7	10.9	12.5	16.0	15.8	15.5	10.6	12.4	25.3	27.1
Income	16.8	16.9	17.5	26.1	19.2	11.6	13.2	13.2	4.8	17.8	27.7	16.2	7.0	17.7	46.6	14.2
Insecurity	0.16	0.52	0.24	0.86	0.15	0.25	0.05	0.47	0.14	0.79	0.17	0.29	0.11	0.56	0.30	0.39
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	13.3	15.9	17.8	23.2	13.0	13.8	7.8	10.5	9.4	12.4	16.9	19.0	12.6	16.4	15.4	14.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.3	3.3	2.5	5.8	0.5	2.3	0.6	1.8	1.4	3.6	1.1	3.1	1.2	3.8	1.6	1.6

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 years only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.15. Precarious Employment in the Czech Republic 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.2	0.2	0.3	1.9	1.7	1.1	1.0	1.8	1.1
Involuntary temporary	5.5	7.5	7.2	12.5	5.1	6.2	4.4	5.4	4.4	6.2	6.6	8.9	5.4	7.4	13.5	15.2
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	10.6	11.6	10.8	13.0	10.7	10.8	10.4	11.4	12.1	13.0	9.1	10.2	10.6	11.5	15.4	16.8
Saturday/Sunday work	19.8	17.0	20.7	18.4	19.8	16.5	18.9	16.5	21.1	17.5	18.4	16.6	19.7	17.0	27.7	19.0
Long usual hours of work[a]	9.3	6.9	10.3	7.1	9.8	7.1	8.0	6.5	13.9	10.0	4.3	3.6	9.3	6.7	13.1	17.1
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	2.8	3.2	2.9	3.2	2.7	3.3	2.8	3.1	3.5	3.6	2.1	2.7	2.8	3.1	2.7	6.5

Public Employment Services involvement	8.5	9.4	12.6	16.0	7.8	8.6	5.7	5.5	7.4	7.7	9.6	11.2	8.5	9.3	10.8	17.4
Income	19.4	0.0	17.8	0.0	19.2	0.0	21.0	0.0	11.8	0.0	27.3	0.0	19.4	0.0	19.4	0.0
Insecurity	0.30	0.29	0.31	0.34	0.25	0.25	0.35	0.30	0.29	0.16	0.31	0.43	0.30	0.29	0.52	0.54
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	1.2	3.0	2.0	5.4	0.9	2.3	0.8	1.9	1.2	2.3	1.1	3.6	1.1	2.9	5.2	7.6
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.6	0.9	0.8	1.4	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.9	1.5	1.1

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.16. Precarious Employment in Germany 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	5.6	3.8	4.9	3.3	4.5	3.4	7.0	4.4	2.8	2.0	8.5	5.7	5.2	3.4	10.2	7.8
Involuntary temporary	2.4	1.7	3.7	2.6	1.6	1.6	2.1	1.1	2.0	1.5	2.7	1.9	2.2	1.5	4.8	3.1
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	26.9	26.6	28.3	28.9	27.5	26.2	25.4	25.3	29.6	29.0	24.1	24.2	26.5	26.2	32.0	31.6
Saturday/Sunday work	24.3	24.6	25.4	26.1	24.7	24.1	23.2	23.9	22.3	22.7	26.4	26.6	24.0	24.1	28.6	29.7
Long usual hours of work[a]	8.7	9.7	7.8	9.1	9.2	10.2	8.9	9.8	10.4	11.1	5.5	6.9	8.8	9.8	6.5	8.4
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	4.9	3.5	4.8	3.2	5.2	3.6	4.8	3.5	5.7	4.3	4.1	2.5	5.1	3.6	3.1	2.1

Public Employment Services involvement	4.0	9.7	6.9	15.8	3.5	8.8	2.5	6.0	3.6	9.3	4.5	10.2	3.8	8.9	7.2	17.8
Income	14.3	16.9	14.4	19.9	14.3	16.1	14.3	15.2	4.9	9.8	24.1	24.3	13.6	16.8	23.3	17.5
Insecurity	0.69	0.43	0.91	0.65	0.53	0.37	0.69	0.32	0.65	0.41	0.73	0.46	0.67	0.44	0.99	0.40
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	5.3	5.0	4.4	5.5	5.5	4.7	5.6	4.8	5.7	4.9	4.8	5.1	5.1	4.7	7.4	8.2
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.0	0.8	1.5	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.6	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.3	0.9

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.17. Precarious Employment in Denmark 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	3.8	3.4	4.6	4.4	3.3	3.0	3.7	3.1	1.5	1.5	5.5	5.2	3.5	3.1	9.0	7.8
Involuntary temporary	3.5	2.8	6.3	5.5	3.1	2.2	2.4	1.6	2.9	2.0	3.9	3.4	3.4	2.6	6.0	4.2
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	14.3	15.8	15.7	17.5	14.0	15.4	13.8	15.1	16.6	17.9	12.6	13.9	14.1	15.4	19.2	20.3
Saturday/Sunday work	17.0	16.1	18.1	17.6	16.5	15.3	16.9	15.8	17.9	16.6	16.3	15.5	16.9	15.8	19.8	18.9
Long usual hours of work[a]	4.5	4.4	2.7	2.6	4.4	3.8	5.4	5.8	4.4	6.0	4.6	2.6	4.5	4.6	3.2	2.7
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	4.4	3.5	3.7	2.4	4.6	3.8	4.5	3.9	6.7	4.7	2.6	2.4	4.4	3.6	3.2	2.0

Public Employment Services involvement	14.5	16.7	25.8	29.2	14.5	15.2	9.2	10.9	15.1	16.7	14.1	16.8	14.3	16.3	21.0	22.2
Income	7.8	11.3	14.8	22.7	6.7	9.5	5.4	6.3	6.4	10.0	8.9	12.5	7.4	11.2	17.9	13.2
Insecurity	0.99	0.66	1.32	0.69	1.02	0.58	0.82	0.69	1.03	0.51	0.97	0.79	1.00	0.64	0.80	0.88
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	4.8	5.4	7.6	9.7	4.2	4.1	3.8	4.0	4.6	4.5	4.9	6.3	4.6	4.7	7.4	14.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	2.3	2.6	3.4	3.0	2.4	2.8	1.7	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.6	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.7

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.18. Precarious Employment in Estonia 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	1.8	1.1	1.3	1.1	2.0	1.1	2.1	1.2	0.7	0.7	2.8	1.6	1.6	1.2	3.8	0.9
Involuntary temporary	1.4	0.8	2.0	0.6	1.1	0.7	1.5	1.0	2.1	1.1	0.9	0.5	1.2	0.8	2.8	0.9
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	20.5	18.1	17.6	17.8	21.3	16.2	21.7	20.2	19.8	17.7	21.1	18.5	19.2	16.4	29.7	33.0
Saturday/Sunday work	19.9	19.4	18.7	19.3	20.8	16.5	19.9	22.1	19.4	17.9	20.4	20.8	19.4	18.4	23.3	27.4
Long usual hours of work[a]	6.4	5.5	5.3	5.8	6.6	5.1	6.9	5.6	8.6	6.9	4.2	4.0	6.2	5.2	7.5	7.7
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	1.5	1.2	1.5	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.7	1.2	1.7	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.6	1.3	0.7	0.3

Public Employment Services involvement	12.8	12.3	17.2	18.7	13.1	10.8	9.7	8.5	15.0	11.6	11.0	13.0	12.9	12.1	12.7	13.6
Income	15.2	19.1	14.7	17.3	15.0	18.5	15.6	21.1	8.0	13.9	21.4	24.1	13.9	18.8	24.0	21.9
Insecurity	0.53	0.39	0.63	0.41	0.38	0.35	0.62	0.40	0.80	0.46	0.30	0.32	0.55	0.27	0.43	1.43
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	8.3	8.8	7.8	7.5	6.5	7.6	10.5	11.0	6.6	6.1	9.8	11.4	7.4	8.4	15.1	12.2
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.6	1.8	2.4	1.8	1.4	1.7	1.2	1.8	2.1	2.0	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.6	2.6	3.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.19. Precarious Employment in Spain 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	6.6	11.3	7.6	16.4	6.4	9.5	6.0	9.9	2.3	5.8	11.3	17.0	6.2	10.8	13.4	18.6
Involuntary temporary	17.3	20.8	24.5	32.0	16.5	20.1	11.8	14.3	16.0	20.1	18.8	21.5	16.4	20.3	30.9	28.3
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	17.8	18.6	19.6	20.8	17.4	18.7	16.7	17.2	18.4	20.4	17.2	16.8	17.7	18.5	19.6	20.8
Saturday/Sunday work	22.8	25.9	25.1	30.2	22.1	26.0	21.5	23.0	20.5	24.8	25.3	27.0	22.5	25.4	27.6	32.6
Long usual hours of work[a]	8.8	7.8	9.2	7.7	9.1	8.3	8.0	7.3	11.1	9.8	5.6	5.1	8.3	7.7	15.1	10.1
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	2.3	2.8	2.3	2.4	2.7	3.4	1.7	2.5	2.5	3.1	2.0	2.5	2.3	2.9	1.5	1.9

Public Employment Services involvement	11.9	14.4	18.1	25.4	11.0	13.2	7.2	8.7	11.5	15.0	12.4	13.8	11.1	13.8	23.8	24.7
Income	17.2	0.0	20.1	0.0	17.5	0.0	14.2	0.0	7.7	0.0	27.4	0.0	16.3	0.0	29.6	0.0
Insecurity	1.16	1.52	1.75	2.63	1.12	1.42	0.68	0.93	1.21	1.41	1.12	1.64	1.07	1.51	2.48	1.73
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	14.7	18.2	19.1	20.7	15.7	20.2	9.6	14.5	14.0	16.0	15.4	20.5	14.7	18.4	14.7	15.3
Working conditions dissatisfaction	3.5	5.1	5.3	9.5	3.3	4.4	2.0	2.9	3.1	4.6	3.9	5.5	3.2	4.9	7.5	7.8

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.20. Precarious Employment in Finland 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	2.6	3.0	3.5	4.3	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.5	1.3	1.7	3.9	4.3	2.5	2.7	7.7	10.7
Involuntary temporary	4.7	5.0	8.7	9.6	3.7	4.3	3.0	2.7	3.0	3.9	6.3	6.1	4.7	4.9	6.4	9.1
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	20.1	21.1	22.0	22.5	19.7	20.9	19.2	20.3	20.5	21.2	19.8	21.0	20.2	20.9	15.2	27.6
Saturday/Sunday work	17.9	19.3	20.9	20.5	17.9	19.8	16.0	18.2	16.4	17.4	19.4	21.2	17.9	19.2	19.5	24.2
Long usual hours of work[a]	6.7	8.3	6.3	6.3	6.6	8.3	7.1	9.5	9.3	10.4	4.2	6.1	6.7	8.3	6.9	8.5
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	1.0	1.2	0.9	0.7	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.3	1.4	1.3	0.6	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.6

Public Employment Services involvement	5.5	6.1	10.3	11.5	4.7	5.2	3.0	3.5	5.2	5.9	5.8	6.4	5.5	6.0	7.1	8.9
Income	6.2	7.4	10.4	13.0	4.8	6.6	4.8	4.5	3.3	6.6	9.0	8.2	6.1	7.2	12.8	13.1
Insecurity	1.23	1.48	2.33	2.88	1.16	1.01	0.56	0.96	1.00	1.27	1.44	1.68	1.22	1.46	1.68	2.22
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.4	4.2	4.6	3.2	3.8	2.2	2.9	5.5	5.5	3.9	4.2	5.1	4.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.3	1.7	2.1	2.5	1.6	1.7	0.6	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.8	1.3	1.7	1.7	3.3

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.21. Precarious Employment in France 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	5.7	8.1	6.1	8.5	5.3	7.3	5.8	8.5	2.1	3.2	9.3	12.7	5.5	7.5	10.6	17.7
Involuntary temporary	7.1	8.6	11.4	14.0	6.3	7.8	4.5	5.6	5.8	7.6	8.3	9.5	6.7	8.0	14.7	18.2
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	17.7	2.1	19.8	2.6	17.6	2.2	16.1	1.8	20.0	2.7	15.4	1.6	17.8	2.1	15.8	2.5
Saturday/Sunday work	26.5	9.5	30.2	11.4	26.0	9.3	24.1	8.5	23.2	8.8	29.7	10.2	26.6	9.5	25.2	11.0
Long usual hours of work[a]	12.1	10.5	10.9	9.6	12.4	10.7	12.8	10.9	14.7	12.0	8.6	8.5	12.1	10.6	12.0	9.1
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	5.7	3.5	6.5	3.9	5.9	3.5	4.9	3.2	5.8	3.7	5.6	3.3	5.9	3.6	2.5	1.6

Public Employment Services involvement	6.4	7.4	10.9	13.3	5.7	6.6	3.5	4.3	6.1	7.2	6.6	7.6	6.1	7.1	11.7	13.5
Income	5.6	1.9	5.9	2.7	5.5	1.7	5.5	1.5	2.5	1.4	8.7	2.4	5.4	1.8	9.6	2.9
Insecurity	0.70	0.49	1.05	0.68	0.69	0.49	0.45	0.36	0.70	0.48	0.71	0.50	0.66	0.47	1.52	0.78
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	6.9	7.9	11.9	11.6	7.0	9.3	2.8	4.2	4.9	5.5	8.8	10.2	6.7	7.8	9.0	9.9
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.5	2.4	2.0	3.3	1.5	2.5	1.1	1.7	1.2	2.2	1.8	2.6	1.5	2.3	2.3	4.3

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.22. Precarious Employment in Greece 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	4.2	8.0	5.2	11.3	4.0	7.3	3.2	6.2	2.6	6.2	6.0	10.1	3.5	6.9	8.8	19.4
Involuntary temporary	9.1	8.3	12.1	12.3	8.9	7.5	5.9	6.1	8.0	7.7	10.3	9.0	7.6	7.7	18.8	14.9
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	25.9	29.9	30.4	37.7	25.0	29.3	22.2	24.4	24.6	30.7	27.6	29.1	25.9	29.9	26.5	30.1
Saturday/Sunday work	31.8	32.9	35.8	39.9	31.5	32.9	27.7	27.4	34.5	35.5	28.4	30.0	29.1	31.2	50.3	49.7
Long usual hours of work[a]	19.5	15.8	22.2	19.0	19.2	16.2	17.0	12.8	22.9	17.2	15.0	14.0	16.5	13.9	41.1	37.4
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	3.2	2.9	3.6	2.8	3.3	3.2	2.7	2.8	3.7	3.3	2.6	2.5	3.3	2.9	2.5	2.9

Public Employment Services involvement	9.3	11.8	13.1	17.7	8.4	10.6	6.1	8.3	9.1	11.7	9.5	11.9	8.2	11.3	16.4	16.6
Income	10.1	15.5	13.6	25.8	9.3	13.6	7.1	9.4	5.9	15.0	15.3	16.1	7.9	14.5	24.9	25.0
Insecurity	0.73	0.51	1.23	0.87	0.55	0.37	0.40	0.39	0.74	0.63	0.73	0.39	0.64	0.40	1.39	1.61
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	7.1	11.3	9.4	18.1	6.7	10.0	5.1	7.4	6.7	10.2	7.6	12.5	7.3	11.9	6.0	5.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.6	0.6	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	1.1	2.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.23. Precarious Employment in Croatia 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	0.4	1.1	0.5	1.5	0.2	1.0	0.6	1.0	0.2	1.2	0.6	1.1	0.4	1.2	n.a.	0.0
Involuntary temporary	5.2	8.5	8.8	13.7	4.4	6.4	3.3	6.3	5.0	8.7	5.5	8.3	5.2	8.5	n.a.	0.0
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	3.4	4.7	3.3	4.9	2.9	4.5	3.9	4.6	3.7	5.1	3.2	4.2	3.5	4.7	n.a.	0.0
Saturday/Sunday work	12.9	14.6	15.8	15.9	11.5	14.9	11.8	13.4	12.2	14.4	13.5	14.9	12.8	14.6	n.a.	23.1
Long usual hours of work[a]	7.0	7.0	8.1	6.2	6.2	8.6	6.7	6.1	9.1	9.3	4.7	4.5	7.0	7.0	n.a.	0.0

Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	0.8	0.7	1.0	0.7	0.8	1.1	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.8	0.7	n.a.	0.0
Public Employment Services involvement	5.4	9.5	8.9	15.5	5.6	8.0	2.7	6.0	5.2	10.9	5.5	8.1	5.4	9.5	n.a.	0.0
Income	16.3	12.8	18.1	17.2	17.2	12.2	14.3	9.7	10.8	12.9	22.0	12.7	16.3	12.8	n.a.	7.7
Insecurity	1.31	1.97	2.17	3.47	1.62	1.29	0.46	1.41	1.29	1.96	1.32	1.98	1.31	1.98	n.a.	0.00
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	2.4	4.3	2.8	7.5	2.6	3.8	2.0	2.1	1.5	3.2	3.4	5.4	2.4	4.3	n.a.	0.0
Working conditions dissatisfaction	4.1	5.7	5.0	6.3	4.4	6.0	3.3	4.9	4.2	5.8	4.1	5.7	4.1	5.7	n.a.	15.4

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.24. Precarious Employment in Hungary 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.0	2.5	1.6	1.9	2.9	2.9	2.2	2.3	4.4	9.2
Involuntary temporary	8.0	10.8	9.5	11.8	7.6	10.0	7.1	10.9	8.5	10.8	7.4	10.8	8.0	10.8	14.3	12.5
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	10.9	13.5	11.7	14.6	11.2	13.7	9.7	12.3	12.5	15.5	9.1	11.2	10.9	13.5	8.7	14.7
Saturday/Sunday work	10.4	9.3	11.3	9.6	10.8	9.8	9.1	8.4	11.1	10.5	9.6	8.0	10.4	9.3	11.2	11.4
Long usual hours of work[a]	3.9	8.1	4.0	8.1	3.9	8.3	3.8	7.7	5.4	10.9	2.3	4.9	3.9	8.0	6.7	16.3
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.0

Public Employment Services involvement	11.3	11.2	15.9	15.8	10.4	10.3	8.3	8.6	12.3	11.3	10.4	11.2	11.3	11.2	15.6	16.9
Income	23.3	0.0	21.6	0.0	23.5	0.0	24.7	0.0	17.9	0.0	29.0	0.0	23.3	0.0	30.5	0.0
Insecurity	0.19	0.15	0.24	0.18	0.17	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.17	0.15	0.20	0.15	0.19	0.15	0.31	0.74
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	2.4	3.1	4.5	5.4	1.6	2.8	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.5	3.3	3.9	2.4	3.1	1.9	7.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.7

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.25. Precarious Employment in Ireland 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	6.1	8.0	6.3	8.3	5.5	6.8	6.7	9.2	4.5	6.4	7.6	9.5	5.6	7.8	9.2	9.1
Involuntary temporary	2.3	4.0	3.0	5.1	2.0	3.4	1.7	3.4	2.3	4.3	2.3	3.7	2.3	4.0	2.6	4.0
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	12.8	12.7	13.5	13.6	12.6	13.0	11.9	11.5	15.1	15.4	10.6	10.3	11.7	11.8	18.6	18.5
Saturday/Sunday work	17.3	25.5	19.4	29.4	16.7	24.5	15.1	22.6	18.6	28.2	16.2	23.0	15.7	23.4	26.8	37.8
Long usual hours of work[a]	5.6	7.3	4.4	6.2	7.5	7.8	4.9	7.9	8.4	10.2	2.3	3.9	5.7	7.5	5.0	6.0
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	2.6	3.1	2.4	2.9	3.1	3.4	2.4	3.0	3.3	3.3	2.1	2.9	2.8	3.3	1.6	1.8

Public Employment Services involvement	8.1	6.9	11.1	10.9	7.3	5.8	4.6	4.1	8.8	7.3	7.4	6.6	7.4	6.1	12.0	11.6
Income	5.1	4.2	4.5	3.7	5.2	4.0	6.0	4.9	1.4	2.2	8.5	5.9	4.9	4.2	6.6	4.2
Insecurity	0.49	0.24	0.59	0.23	0.48	0.26	0.37	0.21	0.62	0.26	0.39	0.21	0.50	0.24	0.48	0.22
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	14.6	16.8	19.8	21.3	13.6	17.0	8.5	11.6	12.7	14.5	16.4	18.9	13.6	15.8	20.6	22.6
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.4	0.8	0.5	1.2	0.4	0.9	0.1	0.4	0.5	1.0	0.3	0.7	0.4	0.8	0.5	1.1

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.26. Precarious Employment in Iceland 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	4.4	3.5	4.2	2.7	3.8	4.0	5.0	3.7	1.8	0.8	6.8	5.9	4.1	3.5	8.4	3.5
Involuntary temporary	1.5	1.0	2.1	1.9	1.4	0.8	1.0	0.4	1.5	0.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	2.0	0.3
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	16.4	13.6	16.8	15.1	13.5	13.6	18.7	12.2	20.4	17.9	12.6	9.7	16.3	13.1	19.2	20.7
Saturday/Sunday work	17.0	16.6	17.0	19.5	14.3	14.3	19.2	16.1	20.6	22.7	13.5	11.2	16.8	15.9	20.0	26.4
Long usual hours of work[a]	24.6	27.5	21.1	25.1	23.6	26.3	28.7	30.6	36.0	38.7	10.2	14.0	25.1	27.4	16.4	27.8
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	27.1	9.1	25.2	4.7	27.9	10.6	28.2	11.9	34.2	9.7	20.3	8.6	27.6	9.6	17.6	2.9

Public Employment Services involvement	12.5	15.4	21.0	24.1	9.0	13.1	7.7	9.5	13.9	14.6	11.2	16.1	12.6	15.2	12.4	18.5
Income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Insecurity	0.63	0.10	0.92	0.26	0.59	0.06	0.40	0.00	0.62	0.13	0.64	0.08	0.67	0.11	0.00	0.00
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	3.3	6.3	5.9	9.3	3.0	6.0	1.2	3.8	3.0	5.1	3.7	7.3	2.8	5.8	13.2	13.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	2.2	3.0	3.4	4.2	2.0	3.2	1.2	1.7	2.5	3.1	1.9	2.9	2.2	2.9	2.8	3.8

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.27. Precarious Employment in Italy 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	8.0	13.3	9.8	17.6	8.1	12.8	6.6	11.7	3.0	6.5	13.9	21.0	7.2	11.7	14.9	24.5
Involuntary temporary	8.9	10.8	13.0	17.7	8.7	10.2	6.5	7.8	7.2	9.8	11.0	11.9	8.7	10.3	11.3	13.9
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	14.2	16.9	14.8	18.4	15.0	17.2	12.9	15.9	16.9	20.1	11.0	13.4	13.5	16.5	20.1	20.1
Saturday/Sunday work	30.9	31.9	31.9	35.4	30.3	31.0	30.8	30.9	29.7	31.0	32.3	32.8	30.3	30.5	36.9	41.1
Long usual hours of work[a]	6.8	6.7	6.7	7.3	7.1	6.9	6.6	6.3	8.6	7.9	3.9	4.8	6.3	6.0	11.7	12.6
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	1.5	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.5	1.3	1.7	1.3	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.6	1.3	0.9	0.7

Public Employment Services involvement	8.9	10.2	15.0	18.9	8.4	9.6	5.4	6.6	8.0	9.8	10.0	10.7	8.2	9.6	15.5	14.4
Income	18.8	15.9	23.5	25.2	19.0	15.3	15.5	12.0	9.2	11.9	30.1	20.4	16.9	15.9	36.1	16.0
Insecurity	0.63	0.68	0.96	1.01	0.60	0.68	0.44	0.51	0.66	0.70	0.59	0.64	0.62	0.69	0.68	0.58
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	3.6	4.8	5.8	7.5	3.7	5.3	2.0	2.9	2.4	3.0	4.9	6.7	3.1	4.3	7.4	8.0
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.28. Precarious Employment in Latvia 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	n.a.	2.1	n.a.	1.6	n.a.	1.7	n.a.	2.9	n.a.	1.1	n.a.	3.1	n.a.	2.1	n.a.	3.0
Involuntary temporary	n.a.	1.5	n.a.	1.7	n.a.	1.0	n.a.	1.8	n.a.	1.9	n.a.	1.1	n.a.	1.5	n.a.	1.8
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	n.a.	9.7	n.a.	9.1	n.a.	9.5	n.a.	10.2	n.a.	10.9	n.a.	8.6	n.a.	9.5	n.a.	10.8
Saturday/Sunday work	n.a.	20.5	n.a.	19.9	n.a.	20.2	n.a.	21.3	n.a.	20.5	n.a.	20.5	n.a.	20.0	n.a.	25.0
Long usual hours of work[a]	n.a.	3.9	n.a.	3.4	n.a.	4.3	n.a.	3.8	n.a.	4.9	n.a.	2.9	n.a.	3.8	n.a.	5.1
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	n.a.	0.0	n.a.	0.1	n.a.	0.0	n.a.	0.0	n.a.	0.0	n.a.	0.0	n.a.	0.0	n.a.	0.0

Public Employment Services involvement	n.a.	12.1	n.a.	18.4	n.a.	10.9	n.a.	8.6	n.a.	13.3	n.a.	11.1	n.a.	12.3	n.a.	10.9
Income	n.a.	22.7	n.a.	19.1	n.a.	21.2	n.a.	26.6	n.a.	20.7	n.a.	24.4	n.a.	22.5	n.a.	24.5
Insecurity	n.a.	0.13	n.a.	0.07	n.a.	0.26	n.a.	0.07	n.a.	0.14	n.a.	0.13	n.a.	0.09	n.a.	0.50
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	n.a.	6.9	n.a.	9.1	n.a.	6.0	n.a.	6.1	n.a.	5.9	n.a.	7.8	n.a.	7.1	n.a.	5.2
Working conditions dissatisfaction	n.a.	1.1	n.a.	1.4	n.a.	1.2	n.a.	0.7	n.a.	1.3	n.a.	0.9	n.a.	1.1	n.a.	0.7

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.29. Precarious Employment in Lithuania 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	2.7	2.4	2.1	1.8	2.9	2.4	2.9	2.7	1.7	1.2	3.5	3.4	2.7	2.4	3.2	2.0
Involuntary temporary	1.5	1.2	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.6	1.3	2.0	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.2	0.8	2.0
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	11.6	10.3	10.3	8.3	12.6	10.1	11.5	11.3	12.1	11.2	11.3	9.6	11.6	10.3	19.4	5.0
Saturday/Sunday work	13.4	16.3	11.2	12.7	15.0	16.3	13.3	18.0	13.0	16.0	13.7	16.6	13.4	16.4	12.9	8.9
Long usual hours of work[a]	1.8	1.5	2.0	1.0	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.0	1.2	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.5	0.9	2.1
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	0.7	0.4	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.4	1.6	0.0

Public Employment Services involvement	11.7	12.0	14.8	19.0	11.0	11.2	10.6	9.4	15.1	14.0	9.2	10.5	11.7	12.0	16.9	10.9
Income	13.8	16.4	11.3	16.3	13.9	15.2	15.0	17.2	10.0	16.2	16.7	16.4	13.8	16.3	16.9	18.8
Insecurity	0.22	0.08	0.22	0.14	0.14	0.07	0.27	0.06	0.26	0.05	0.18	0.11	0.21	0.08	1.61	0.00
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	6.3	9.5	9.4	16.2	6.3	8.8	4.6	6.8	6.3	9.0	6.3	9.8	6.2	9.5	12.9	8.9
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.8	0.7	1.2	1.8	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.6	0.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.30. Precarious Employment in Luxembourg 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.5	0.2	0.4	2.6	2.8	1.0	0.8	1.7	2.4
Involuntary temporary	2.0	2.1	3.2	3.4	1.7	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.1	1.7	1.1	2.4	3.3
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	12.8	10.0	13.6	11.8	12.4	9.7	12.8	8.8	13.6	10.8	12.0	9.1	13.7	10.6	11.6	9.3
Saturday/Sunday work	14.6	10.9	17.0	13.0	13.4	10.3	14.1	9.9	13.5	10.0	15.8	12.0	15.0	11.5	14.1	10.3
Long usual hours of work[a]	5.9	12.0	4.7	11.7	6.6	11.7	6.1	12.5	7.3	14.0	3.5	8.8	5.1	11.3	6.9	12.7
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	15.1	9.0	13.4	9.9	16.5	8.8	14.8	8.5	16.5	8.5	13.5	9.6	14.1	10.4	16.4	7.5

Public Employment Services involvement	7.4	5.4	12.0	9.3	6.4	4.5	4.8	2.9	6.5	5.3	8.3	5.4	7.2	3.7	7.6	7.3
Income	17.2	16.1	18.8	24.0	17.2	14.0	16.1	11.5	7.2	13.5	28.1	18.8	12.5	13.4	23.7	19.1
Insecurity	0.71	1.23	1.47	1.92	0.41	1.02	0.45	0.87	0.85	1.31	0.56	1.15	0.60	0.85	0.86	1.68
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.2	1.6	1.6	0.9	0.8	2.3	2.1
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.7	1.4	3.2	2.1	1.6	1.4	0.7	0.8	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.2	1.4	1.0	2.1	1.9

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.31. Precarious Employment in Malta 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	1.5	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.6	2.8	1.1	1.2	2.3	2.7	1.6	1.9	1.0	1.7
Involuntary temporary	2.2	3.4	2.6	3.6	2.1	2.8	1.7	3.8	1.6	2.5	3.1	4.5	2.1	3.2	4.1	7.5
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	16.0	12.6	16.3	12.5	15.0	11.6	16.6	13.9	18.9	15.7	11.0	8.6	15.9	12.4	16.9	15.8
Saturday/Sunday work	25.2	24.6	24.8	22.5	23.6	26.3	27.2	24.8	27.4	27.5	21.4	20.8	25.3	24.5	23.6	25.3
Long usual hours of work[a]	8.1	8.5	5.8	7.1	9.2	9.3	9.8	9.3	9.9	9.6	4.2	6.8	8.2	8.4	6.1	10.1
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.2	3.1	2.1	2.0	2.4	2.8	2.7	1.6	0.7	2.3	1.9	2.6	2.1

Public Employment Services involvement	6.9	6.2	9.0	8.2	6.7	5.8	4.8	4.3	6.5	5.1	7.7	7.6	6.7	6.1	12.8	7.9
Income	16.0	16.4	15.9	16.4	16.5	16.7	15.6	16.2	10.9	9.9	24.8	24.8	15.8	16.3	22.6	19.5
Insecurity	0.28	0.08	0.52	0.00	0.16	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.36	0.03	0.14	0.14	0.29	0.05	0.00	0.68
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	2.2	3.7	3.6	5.2	1.4	4.1	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.3	2.8	5.5	2.0	3.4	7.7	11.3
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.3	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.8	0.7	0.6	1.0	1.2	1.5	2.1

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.32. Precarious Employment in the Netherlands 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	2.2	3.9	3.2	6.0	1.4	2.5	2.1	3.7	1.3	2.7	3.1	5.1	2.1	3.9	5.1	5.7
Involuntary temporary	3.6	7.1	6.3	12.4	2.9	5.7	2.2	4.8	3.4	6.6	3.8	7.6	3.3	6.9	10.8	11.6
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	27.8	27.5	27.3	30.2	28.4	26.0	27.7	26.9	30.0	28.7	25.6	26.2	27.8	27.6	28.0	25.1
Saturday/Sunday work	22.5	22.9	23.7	26.6	21.3	20.4	22.6	22.5	21.3	21.1	23.7	24.7	22.5	22.9	22.3	22.7
Long usual hours of work[a]	1.6	1.1	1.4	0.7	1.3	1.3	2.0	1.2	1.8	1.2	0.7	0.8	1.6	1.1	1.4	1.3
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	20.2	22.3	18.9	21.1	20.4	23.2	21.1	22.3	22.1	24.3	18.3	20.3	20.5	22.4	13.4	19.5

Public Employment Services involvement	9.6	10.4	15.5	17.3	8.9	9.6	5.8	6.9	9.0	10.4	10.1	10.5	9.3	10.2	18.1	17.2
Income	8.8	12.7	9.4	19.4	9.0	11.0	8.2	9.9	3.3	8.6	14.2	16.7	8.6	12.6	15.9	15.9
Insecurity	0.68	1.11	0.82	1.17	0.64	1.02	0.60	1.14	0.70	0.94	0.65	1.28	0.69	1.10	0.33	1.36
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	4.9	6.1	6.7	8.5	4.6	6.2	3.8	4.6	4.3	5.1	5.4	7.1	4.7	6.1	9.6	7.5
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.33. Precarious Employment in Norway 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	3.9	3.7	4.6	5.2	3.4	3.2	3.8	3.0	1.2	1.5	6.5	6.0	3.7	3.2	6.4	7.7
Involuntary temporary	3.5	4.3	5.8	7.3	3.0	3.9	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.4	4.8	6.3	3.2	3.8	7.3	8.5
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	10.6	11.9	13.1	15.1	9.3	10.9	10.0	10.0	10.8	12.9	10.4	10.8	10.4	11.6	13.6	13.8
Saturday/Sunday work	14.0	13.1	17.4	17.0	13.0	11.3	12.3	11.6	13.9	13.6	14.2	12.6	13.8	12.5	17.2	18.0
Long usual hours of work[a]	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.4	1.7	2.8	2.6	3.6	3.2	1.1	0.9	2.5	2.2	3.3	2.4
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	3.5	3.6	2.8	3.0	3.7	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.2	3.3	2.9	4.0	3.6	3.8	2.9	2.2

Public Employment Services involvement	7.2	6.9	11.3	11.9	6.7	6.2	4.5	3.4	7.8	6.6	6.7	7.2	6.9	6.6	11.4	9.2
Income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Insecurity	0.71	0.93	0.66	1.14	0.84	0.85	0.61	0.82	0.81	1.12	0.62	0.72	0.73	0.87	0.36	1.37
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	4.5	6.9	7.1	10.7	4.3	6.3	2.7	4.3	3.9	7.0	5.1	6.8	4.0	5.4	11.4	19.5
Working conditions dissatisfaction	5.7	5.5	7.1	6.8	6.1	5.4	4.0	4.6	6.0	5.4	5.4	5.7	5.8	5.5	4.7	6.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.34. Precarious Employment in Poland 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	1.7	2.2	1.7	2.3	1.5	1.9	1.9	2.3	0.8	1.1	2.6	3.2	1.7	2.2	2.0	2.0
Involuntary temporary	18.9	17.5	25.5	23.9	16.5	15.3	14.1	12.9	19.6	17.6	18.2	17.4	18.9	17.5	32.7	27.5
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	6.3	5.4	6.1	4.9	6.5	5.6	6.4	5.6	6.8	5.9	5.9	4.8	6.3	5.4	10.2	3.3
Saturday/Sunday work	8.7	7.5	9.3	7.7	8.9	7.6	7.8	7.1	9.9	8.5	7.5	6.6	8.7	7.5	15.3	5.2
Long usual hours of work[a]	12.3	9.4	13.1	9.7	13.0	10.0	10.8	8.3	17.8	12.9	6.4	5.7	12.3	9.4	14.9	8.0
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.4	2.0	0.7

Public Employment Services involvement	11.0	10.3	15.9	15.1	9.5	8.8	7.2	6.6	12.2	10.4	9.8	10.2	11.0	10.2	16.3	24.2
Income	5.8	8.2	5.9	10.0	5.2	7.4	6.4	7.1	3.5	6.7	8.3	9.7	5.8	8.2	14.3	8.5
Insecurity	0.27	0.11	0.30	0.11	0.31	0.13	0.18	0.09	0.26	0.09	0.27	0.13	0.27	0.11	0.00	0.65
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	4.7	6.7	9.7	12.7	2.7	5.3	1.4	1.5	3.7	5.3	5.9	8.0	4.7	6.7	4.1	12.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	2.6	1.2	3.6	1.8	2.3	1.1	1.7	0.6	2.8	1.2	2.3	1.1	2.5	1.2	6.1	3.3

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.35. Precarious Employment in Portugal 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	3.0	4.4	3.3	5.4	2.7	3.8	3.1	4.3	1.4	2.3	4.7	6.2	3.0	4.3	3.9	8.3
Involuntary temporary	18.1	17.3	29.7	28.9	15.8	15.8	11.5	11.5	17.9	17.2	18.3	17.4	17.2	16.9	40.7	35.1
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	7.6	9.1	9.3	11.3	6.9	8.6	7.0	8.2	9.3	10.9	5.9	7.5	7.6	8.9	7.9	16.6
Saturday/Sunday work	20.1	9.7	24.3	10.4	19.9	10.3	17.2	8.6	19.3	11.2	21.0	8.4	19.6	9.7	32.8	10.8
Long usual hours of work[a]	7.3	15.3	7.0	16.2	7.6	15.3	7.2	14.8	10.2	19.0	4.2	11.8	7.1	15.3	11.1	17.9
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	2.0	7.7	2.0	7.9	2.1	8.5	1.9	6.6	2.0	7.4	2.0	7.9	2.0	7.8	1.7	4.6

Public Employment Services involvement	10.0	11.7	16.5	19.7	9.0	10.9	6.0	7.2	10.8	12.6	9.3	10.8	9.5	11.4	23.7	21.5
Income	12.2	11.8	11.5	17.0	12.7	10.5	12.3	9.7	6.0	12.4	18.4	11.3	12.1	11.8	15.6	12.0
Insecurity	0.25	0.36	0.34	0.59	0.25	0.36	0.19	0.21	0.24	0.33	0.26	0.38	0.23	0.36	0.77	0.20
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	2.5	3.4	4.8	6.2	2.3	3.4	0.9	1.5	1.6	1.9	3.3	4.7	2.2	3.2	9.4	10.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.1	4.0	2.2	6.6	0.8	4.0	0.5	2.3	1.0	3.5	1.1	4.5	1.0	4.0	1.9	7.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.36. Precarious Employment in Romania 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0
Involuntary temporary	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.7	0.6	0.9	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.4	0.6	0.8	0.7	1.1	0.0	0.0
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	16.9	14.8	17.0	14.5	17.9	15.1	15.6	14.7	17.2	15.8	16.6	13.8	16.9	14.8	13.6	11.5
Saturday/Sunday work	22.2	20.6	23.1	21.3	23.0	20.6	20.5	20.1	23.3	22.2	21.0	18.8	22.2	20.6	31.8	19.2
Long usual hours of work[a]	12.5	6.7	12.5	7.2	13.5	6.1	11.5	6.9	14.0	7.3	10.9	6.0	12.5	6.7	13.6	0.0
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	0.8	0.6	0.9	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.0

Public Employment Services involvement	3.6	4.8	5.6	7.5	3.4	4.1	2.2	3.4	3.7	5.4	3.5	4.0	3.6	4.8	13.6	15.4
Income	20.2	22.3	20.7	23.8	20.9	21.9	18.7	21.5	13.7	22.6	27.4	21.8	20.2	22.3	9.1	34.6
Insecurity	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.00
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	2.0	4.4	3.6	8.2	1.7	3.9	1.2	2.1	1.8	3.9	2.3	5.1	2.0	4.4	13.6	15.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.37. Precarious Employment in Sweden 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	6.4	5.8	8.6	7.7	5.3	5.0	5.5	5.0	2.7	3.1	9.9	8.5	6.2	5.5	10.7	12.0
Involuntary temporary	8.5	8.2	13.4	13.8	7.2	6.2	5.4	5.2	6.9	7.2	10.1	9.2	8.2	7.6	15.6	20.8
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	15.7	14.3	19.2	17.9	13.6	12.4	14.5	13.1	15.4	14.6	15.9	14.0	15.5	14.2	18.9	16.4
Saturday/Sunday work	13.5	13.4	17.1	17.1	11.6	11.5	12.1	11.9	10.5	11.3	16.3	15.4	13.3	13.2	17.9	17.5
Long usual hours of work[a]	1.8	4.1	1.7	3.2	1.6	4.9	2.0	4.2	2.2	3.1	1.1	5.5	1.7	4.2	3.5	3.6
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	4.3	4.2	3.6	3.3	4.6	4.4	4.6	4.7	5.6	4.9	3.1	3.5	4.3	4.3	3.6	2.7

Public Employment Services involvement	12.9	13.7	20.2	21.5	11.0	11.9	8.0	8.7	13.7	14.5	12.1	12.9	12.6	13.3	19.2	21.6
Income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Insecurity	1.50	1.44	2.22	1.99	1.32	1.31	1.03	1.10	1.33	1.31	1.67	1.57	1.48	1.38	2.03	2.61
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	5.5	6.9	7.8	9.8	4.9	6.8	4.1	4.5	4.8	6.0	6.3	7.8	5.1	6.4	15.9	17.2
Working conditions dissatisfaction	2.7	3.3	3.7	4.2	2.5	3.3	1.9	2.5	2.5	3.1	2.8	3.5	2.7	3.3	2.8	3.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.38. Precarious Employment in Slovenia 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	n.a.
Involuntary temporary	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	22.0	20.6	22.4	22.8	21.8	20.2	21.7	19.4	22.7	21.4	21.3	19.8	21.9	20.2	24.3	32.3
Saturday/Sunday work	17.7	18.0	19.6	21.3	17.6	17.5	16.5	15.9	18.0	18.2	17.5	17.7	17.7	17.6	21.7	30.5
Long usual hours of work[a]	7.6	8.0	7.0	7.6	8.0	8.3	7.8	7.9	10.0	9.6	5.3	6.2	7.5	7.8	13.7	13.2
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	3.8	4.0	3.4	3.8	3.9	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.8	4.1	3.8	3.9	3.8	4.0	2.7	4.0

Public Employment Services involvement	6.0	8.3	11.6	15.0	5.0	6.7	2.6	4.6	6.2	9.1	5.9	7.4	5.9	8.0	14.6	16.8
Income	16.1	16.7	22.9	28.4	14.2	14.2	12.3	10.2	10.7	14.3	21.0	19.2	15.7	16.5	51.8	25.4
Insecurity	0.44	0.68	0.53	1.15	0.43	0.60	0.38	0.41	0.41	0.53	0.46	0.83	0.44	0.70	0.00	0.18
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	2.3	5.2	4.5	10.1	2.0	4.1	1.0	2.4	1.6	4.1	3.0	6.3	2.3	5.3	4.0	2.4
Working conditions dissatisfaction	1.8	2.2	3.0	3.2	1.7	2.6	0.9	1.2	1.8	2.3	1.7	2.2	1.8	2.2	1.3	2.2

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.39. Precarious Employment in Slovakia 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	1.2	2.0	1.0	1.7	1.3	2.0	1.2	2.2	1.1	1.4	1.3	2.6	1.2	2.0	0.0	0.0
Involuntary temporary	2.5	7.8	3.3	10.1	2.2	7.2	2.1	6.5	2.3	7.0	2.7	8.6	2.5	7.8	0.0	0.0
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	26.0	28.4	25.8	30.2	27.2	28.3	25.0	27.1	29.2	33.4	22.9	23.1	26.0	28.5	17.9	20.8
Saturday/Sunday work	23.9	24.8	22.8	25.5	24.8	24.8	24.0	24.2	24.9	27.5	22.9	21.9	23.9	24.8	15.4	30.2
Long usual hours of work[a]	8.3	9.7	9.9	11.6	7.8	9.7	7.4	8.2	11.2	11.5	5.4	7.8	8.3	9.7	20.5	15.7
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	1.4	1.0	1.9	1.0	1.7	1.2	0.8	0.8	1.7	1.2	1.2	0.8	1.4	1.0	5.1	0.0

Public Employment Services involvement	7.2	9.3	11.2	15.7	6.1	7.8	4.9	5.5	7.4	9.1	7.0	9.6	7.2	9.3	25.6	15.1
Income	6.6	10.5	4.8	9.8	6.0	10.7	8.6	10.9	3.6	8.4	9.5	12.8	6.6	10.5	0.0	13.2
Insecurity	0.16	0.14	0.21	0.24	0.11	0.09	0.16	0.11	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.00	0.00
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	2.0	5.1	3.0	9.2	1.9	4.4	1.2	2.4	1.9	4.2	2.0	6.1	2.0	5.1	10.3	3.8
Working conditions dissatisfaction	0.4	2.2	0.5	2.4	0.3	2.1	0.3	2.2	0.3	1.9	0.4	2.5	0.4	2.2	0.0	0.0

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

Table 2.40. Precarious Employment in the UK 2010–2015.

	Country Total		26–35		36–45		46–55		Men		Women		Own Country		Non-national	
%	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015	2010	2015
Contract																
Involuntary part-time	1.6	3.7	1.7	4.0	1.5	3.6	1.6	3.6	1.2	2.8	2.0	4.5	1.5	3.4	2.8	6.1
Involuntary temporary	1.7	1.8	2.4	2.6	1.6	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	3.5	4.0
Unsociable hours																
Evening/night work	25.5	12.3	26.9	13.9	25.6	12.0	24.0	11.2	29.3	13.7	21.9	10.9	24.8	11.5	32.8	18.3
Saturday/Sunday work	18.4	27.3	21.1	29.0	17.6	26.9	16.8	26.1	19.4	30.8	17.4	23.9	17.7	26.5	25.2	33.7
Long usual hours of work[a]	23.4	25.7	21.0	24.7	25.2	26.1	24.0	26.3	28.9	30.2	15.6	19.4	23.2	25.5	25.7	27.0
Institutional context																
Unpaid overtime	16.7	16.3	14.6	13.6	17.9	17.8	17.2	17.3	17.3	17.1	16.1	15.6	17.2	17.1	11.5	9.7

Public Employment Services involvement	10.7	13.7	16.3	20.0	9.5	13.0	7.0	9.0	10.6	13.3	10.8	14.1	10.0	12.8	18.1	21.3
Income	25.8	12.6	26.6	13.3	25.1	13.0	25.8	11.6	12.2	6.0	38.4	18.7	25.3	12.9	30.3	10.5
Insecurity	1.15	0.95	1.45	1.10	1.15	0.66	0.90	1.10	1.25	1.02	1.06	0.89	1.16	0.93	1.07	1.16
Job context/conditions																
Higher education mismatch	9.2	10.8	12.5	14.3	8.3	10.4	7.3	8.1	7.4	8.6	10.9	12.8	8.9	9.9	12.6	18.3
Working conditions dissatisfaction	2.9	3.4	3.5	3.9	3.0	3.2	2.3	3.1	3.1	3.7	2.7	3.0	2.9	3.3	2.9	3.9

Source: EU LFS, author's own estimations.

Note: The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25–55 only.

[a]It only captures full-time employees.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has offered a survey of measurements of precarious employment that have appeared in the literature over the recent years of research. Different measurements focus on different aspects of the employment relationship. In essence, every job contains elements that one can consider as precarious. Thus, an all-inclusive definition/measurement is difficult to achieve, while every attempt made will always be sensitive to criticism. The present chapter utilised data on millions of European Union employees in order to examine different elements of precariousness and investigate how its intensification has evolved over time and through the years of the recent economic crisis in particular. A total of six different dimensions have been covered, while 11 different measurements have been constructed. The European Union Labour Force Survey has been utilised for the purpose, which consists the most powerful dataset for socio-economic research in Europe. The present study is perhaps the first ever systematic attempt to measure different elements of precarious employment across all EU member states. Various patterns across different workers' groups as well as countries have been identified and discussed. Notably, the so-called vulnerable groups of workers and the countries hit hardest by the economic crisis have experienced a rise in their share in precarious employment. However, even though the present study allows identification of the aspects in need of more attention for policy intervention, its main focus is to provide a comparable account of precarious aspects of employment. In-depth country studies are essential in order to shed more light and fully understand the reasons behind the rise of precarious employment in European Union member states.

DISCUSSION

The first chapter gave an overview of a series of developments around the precarity concept. It shed light on the emergence of a more insecure and precarious workforce since the 1970s that was not contained to the margins of the labour market but gradually extended itself to the more permanent employees. The broadly accepted reasons behind such a development were recognised and discussed, emphasising the wider changes in global economy that gave rise to deregulation policies and more aggressive employers' cost-reduction strategies. Although flexibility was portrayed as a positive development that can enhance employees' job satisfaction, it was discovered that flexible contracts offer less protection, pay and certainty. In addition to that, a series of flexible forms were associated with higher work intensity and health problems as employees experienced higher workloads and more unstable working patterns than in the past. This chapter also outlined significant developments in relation to the progress of the concept, as in different countries diverse definitions emerged for describing precarious employment conditions depending on national institutional, economic and societal factors. The recent

convergence towards an acceptance of precarity might be linked with recent contributions by international organisations and scholars that extensively utilise the term for referring to growing levels of insecurity. However, we also noted that precarity is not politically and ideologically neutral, and there is a dispute over the novelty that is supposedly linked to the term. More structurally oriented accounts argue that precarity has always been a feature of capitalist societies, while others insist that the levels of security enjoyed by European employees since the Second World War were rather unique in the history of capitalism. The fact that in many parts of this world collective systems of representation and trade unions were never important factors of their systems has also been added as evidence of the short-sighted and ahistorical manner through which employment insecurity is theorised. Nevertheless, the term encompasses some analytical vigour especially when applied in contexts hit by significant labour market changes and continuous deterioration in the employment conditions experienced by employees. The eruption of the crisis and the diffusion of the crisis to traditionally more secure employees are signals of the extent to which aspects of precarity are no longer reserved for a tiny minority but increasingly spread out to the majority. Although the danger to categorise everyone under the precarity label is existent, we assume that the very strict boundaries of the past have been erased and nowadays insecurity and thus precarity touches many groups of employees even in different ways. For instance, changes in work organisation and longer hours of work might not be associated with low pay and immediate fear of job loss, they are, however, indicators of a more precarious existence where long-established expectations about work life are short-lived and the near future is uncertain. The inability of European economies to escape vibrantly the economic recession and offer quality and well-paid jobs to European workers and especially the young generation is

another reason that precarity is more than a euphuism. Moreover, the fact that contemporary megacities are overcrowded by 'self-employed' Uber and Deliveroo drivers and cyclists is not a random development but rather a structural change to the conditions that workers work and live in the modern world with significant consequences for their sense of security and stability.

We also outlined labour market developments and political interventions in a series of EU countries to contextualise a bit more emergence of precarisation. After presenting some more generic features of those reforms, we attempted to look at developments in specific member states before and after the crisis, highlighting the degree of change and its effects on employee's sense of security. We found that although deregulation did not happen at the same time in all EU member states, the direction of change has been rather uniform with many countries introducing radical changes and reforms either directly forced by international institutions or indirectly by the EU and domestic pressures. In any case, labour market changes have accelerated precarity as permanent jobs have been destabilised due to changes in collective setting mechanisms and employment protection legislation and flexible jobs have mushroomed due to relaxation of temporary contracts, introduction (easing) of new flexible contracts and other managerial methods (outsourcing). The growing concerns around low pay and extremely variable working hours constitute the talk of the day in many societies nowadays.

These reforms have enabled employers to use labour force in a much more flexible and adaptable way regarding all aspects of the employment relationship (wages, hours, contract type). The rise of involuntary part-time and temporary employment, for instance, highlights the extent that flexibility has become the norm for many workers' lives without their consent and will. In some countries, notably Greece, Spain,

Portugal, precarious work and low-quality jobs are more widespread than in others, mainly because of the structure of their economies and the severity of the economic crisis including the reforms that they had to implement. However, the process of precarisation has also affected stronger EU economies such as Germany and the UK as well since these countries also introduced labour market reforms before the crisis. The rise of very flexible employment contracts and low-paid jobs such as zero-hours contracts (UK) and mini jobs (Germany) indicate that insecurity is not only linked to poor economic performance but it also affects prosperous countries equally. These emerging patterns influence aspects of job quality with employees being less able to determine their work schedule and find time for their family and other commitments. In addition to that, it seems that employees experience high job insecurity levels and fears about contract termination in countries (Nordic) that are seldom associated with insecurity and precarity.

This chapter showed that precarity is associated with the increasing use of flexibility by employers and states in their attempt to manage their workforce in a more flexible and economical manner to increase their profit margins and competitiveness position. To that purpose employees have seen a significant deterioration in various aspects of their employment lives since well-fought rights and benefits have been hit by labour market reforms and more aggressive employers' cost-cutting strategies. Obviously, this process is not linear and unambiguous and its breath and extent depends on various factors (sectoral developments, union power), but it is, however, clear that the trend towards decentralisation of the employment relationship and precarisation of aspects of the employment relationship is broader and more generic now than it used to be before the crisis. In this chapter we avoided to talk about precarity and opted for the term precarisation

since there are differences between employees in terms of job security, wage levels and job satisfaction and not all can be categorised under the term precarity. However, it seems that even secure employees are under intense pressure to accept the worst terms and conditions since capitalism is a crisis-stricken social system that cannot guarantee long-term securities and certainties.

The second chapter of this book has reviewed the various approaches to precarious employment as well as the different measures used for capturing its extent. Having done so, it can be argued that precarious employment is a multidimensional phenomenon that is very difficult to capture in a single measurement. For instance, some jobs that meet all the criteria of standard employment (e.g. full time, open ended, well paid) may still be precarious if they are taken up involuntarily due to severe financial constraints that could, for example, hinder one's future plans about career development. On the other hand, some jobs that at first instance seem precarious (e.g. Sunday/shift work) may occur voluntarily and in fact be preferred to standard forms of work. However, using an approach covering various aspects regarding the type of contract, the context of work and the working conditions can provide some evidence of general trends and patterns. The purpose of this chapter has been to provide some evidence at EU level using a common approach and a harmonised dataset. In particular, the EU Labour Force Survey has been used for EU 28 plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, covering a sample of employees aged 25–64. Three points in time are examined, namely 2005, 2010 and 2015. A total of 11 measures of precarious employment have been used to capture various areas including contract arrangements, work over unsociable hours, effectiveness of the institutional framework, income levels, job insecurity and job context. It is, however, acknowledged that these measures may still not be able to

cover the full extent of precariousness while the measures are susceptible to subjectivity.

Nevertheless, some interesting patterns as well as country differences have occurred from this analysis. First of all, there is a notable intensification of the incidence of precarious employment over the last decade. For instance, work over unsociable hours has increased dramatically. This has, of course, been facilitated by the general trend to offer greater flexibility in the labour market. Nevertheless, one cannot discount the well-documented fact that work over e.g. Sunday or night has detrimental effects on health and well-being. However, most measures included in this study are found to have intensified over the last decade, which has been stigmatised by a severe economic crisis. Thus, one can argue that precariousness is a countercyclical phenomenon that inflates at times of economic uncertainty.

At the same time, some groups of workers are found to be affected more than others, which points towards the generic observation that precariousness affects mostly the group of so-called "vulnerable" workers. In particular, younger workers, females, non-nationals and the low educated are found to be worse off than their counterparts in the labour market. One could argue that labour market flexibility is beneficial for some workers, typically females, who would like to combine work with family responsibilities, but on the other hand this comes often with non-standard forms of work that occur involuntarily or face a wage penalty and adverse working conditions.

Looking at country differences, it has been made evident that member states of Southern Europe, such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal, have suffered considerably more than other countries. On the one hand, this could be interpreted as the outcome of the economic/debt crisis that has not only created economic uncertainty but has also been

accompanied by a set of labour market reforms, which have given rise to precarious employment. Various country differences are also found, and detailed evidence are provided within this chapter. Nevertheless, in order to investigate and analyse the situation in every country separately further detailed work would be needed at the country level, which remains beyond the scope of the present study.

INDEX

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